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I. INTRODUCTION
In late 1991, Algeria was moving rapidly to discard its socialist past and
embrace a democratic future. Tragically, however, hopes for the first free
parliamentary elections in the Arab world fell prey to a military coup d'6tat
t J.D. 1993, Yale Law School I am grateful to Professor W. Michael Reisman, Hughes Hubbard &
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resulting in an oppressive, authoritarian regime and ever-increasing social
instability.1 Although one can only speculate about what would have happened
if the election had not been overturned,
[T]here is no need to speculate about what's happened since Algeria's coup. Elections
remain suspended; elected local councils have been disbanded. Human rights have been
trampled; thousands of Islamic militants spent weeks in desert prison camps. The army's
strong-arm tactics have embarrassed, even discredited, Islamic moderates. And the Salvation
Front has been radicalized.... In sum, the coup has accomplished almost everything the
West did not want to see happen.... Algeria's Islamic majority won't go away, nor will it
become more democracy-minded when its electoral majorities are treated with contemp.
When it scheduled free elections, Algeria became a test case for the
challenge of combining democratic pluralism 3 with fundamentalist Islam.4 On
June 12, 1990, the Islamic Salvation Front ("FIS") swept local elections in
Algeria, marking the first time a fundamentalist Islamic movement gained
significant political power through peaceful, democratic means. In the first
round of parliamentary elections held eighteen months later, the FIS won 188
of the 430 seats while the long-ruling National Liberation Front ("FLN") won
only 16. The FIS was thus poised to win an absolute parliamentary majority
as the second round of parliamentary elections approached. Fearing that an
authoritarian Islamic state might replace the then-existing authoritarian secular
state, a military junta staged a nonviolent coup d'6tat on January 11, 1992, and
installed a new government, which quickly canceled the elections and outlawed
the FIS. With the elimination of peaceful methods of political participation,
extremists within the FIS silenced the moderates and, predictably, began a
1. John P. Entelis, Preface to STATE AND SOCIETY IN ALGERIA at xi (John P. Entelis & Phillip C.
Naylor eds., 1992) [hereinafter STATE AND SOCIETY].
2. Algeria: Keeping Islamists Out of Power - Western and Arab World Reacts to Cancellation of
Elections, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Jan. 24, 1992, at 5, 5 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Islamists Out of
Power].
3. Pluralism as a fact describes the existence in one community of individuals or sub-communities
with differing beliefs. Pluralism as an ideal expresses both the hope and moral sentiment that despite such
differences, these differing communities can and ought to accommodate other beliefs and live in peace.
Democracy, a political system incorporating majority rule and minority rights, is increasingly seen as the
best method of dealing with the fact of pluralism while also achieving its ideals. See generally
DEMOCRACY: THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY (John Dunn ed., 1992) (discussing democracy's increasingly
successful claim to be legitimate form of government).
4. The term "fundamentalist" defies precise definition. One useful definition focuses on "the
reaffirmation of foundational principles and the effort to reshape society in terms of those reaffirmed
fundamentals. This involves... 'the reliance on Islamic fundamental principles to meet the needs and
challenges of contemporary times."' John 0. Voll, Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and
the Sudan, in THE FUNDAMENTALISM PROJECT: FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED 345,347 (Martin E. Marty
& R. Scott Appleby eds., 1991) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALISM] (quoting KARM B. AKHTAR & AIHMAD H.
SAKR, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 61 (1982)). Other frequently used terms with similar or overlapping
meanings include "Islamist," "revivalist Islam" (as distinguished from pietistic Islam), and "political Islam."
Michael C. Dunn, Revivalist Islam and Democracy: Thinking About the Algerian Quandary, 1 MIDDLE E.
POL'Y 16, 17 (1992).
According to one commentator, most Islamic groups are not fundamentalist in the Western sense of
the word, in that they do not advocate passive, literalist reading of scripture. Rather, like the Catholic
Liberation theologians, they urge use of the dynamic strength of religious doctrine to influence and to
improve social and political conditions for the individual and family. Although they may use language that
recalls a glorious Islamic past, they are forward-looking, seeking creative new solutions, and committed
to making a place for Islam within the modem world. Robin Wright, Islam, Democracy, and the West,




This crisis in Algeria revolves around the recurring problem of
apportioning power between competing interest groups. In this case, two
groups have fundamentally different views of reality, one based on Islamic and
the other on secular beliefs. Each seeks to order society according to its
fundamental tenets. Elements within both groups fear defeat and the exclusion
of their viewpoint from public life and thus have demonstrated a willingness
to resort to violence in order to gain control of government institutions.
Because the primary criticism leveled at the FIS was that it was anti-
democratic, this Article will analyze the legitimacy of the coup by exploring
whether FIS control of the parliament would have been more or less likely
than the junta's leadership to lead to the development of democratic structures
and pluralistic ideals. Part II reviews the historical events leading up to the
aborted elections, and Part I examines the proper standards for evaluating the
FIS and the junta. Part IV then argues that the FIS was not as incompatible
with democracy as its opponents claimed, and that proponents of the coup
underestimated the constraints the FIS would have faced in any attempt to
implement anti-democratic policies. Part V builds on Part IV to argue that, ex
ante (as viewed in January 1992), an evaluation of the two alternatives leads
to the conclusion that acceptance of the FIS electoral victory, even with the
significant risks of anti-democratic developments within the FIS, presented
more hope for the development of democratic structures and pluralistic ideals
than did acceptance of the junta. Finally, exploring why Western nations,
which purport to seek the spread of democracy, supported the junta against the
FIS, Part VI concludes that despite their stated pluralist ideals, Western
decisionmakers preferred a familiar secular authoritarianism over an unknown
Islamic pluralism.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE ELECTIONS AND THE CouP
A. Algeria's Economic Crisis
An inquiry into the historical factors that set the stage for the rise of the
FIS and the resulting coup d'6tat reveals that poverty and military power have
been driving forces in Algerian society throughout the twentieth century.
Algeria gained independence from France in 1962 after waging one of the
longest and bloodiest colonial wars of independence in history5 As in many
post-colonial societies, the military officers who played prominent roles in the
revolutionary victory continued to control the fiercely socialist government for
the next thirty years.
Chadli Benjedid became president in 1979 with the military's blessing. By
the mid-1980s, in a radical departure from the government's fiercely
militaristic socialist days and in an attempt to combat serious economic
problems, President Benjedid instituted the process of economic and
5. Official reports stated that the war claimed approximately one million Algerians lives. MAHOUD
BENNOuNE, THE MAKING OF CONTEMPORARY ALGERIA, 1830-1987, at 89 (1988).
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democratic reform that ultimately led to the aborted elections.6 In the early
stages of reform, the government's "simple" plan to change from state
socialism to private enterprise and a free market elicited great optimism in
Algeria and in the international community.7 One commentator observed that
this "Middle Eastern version of glasnost and perestroika seemed to take place
almost overnight" from 1989 to 1990, in a country that had proudly "flaunted
its revolutionary credentials" for years!
In 1991, as part of the reform process, Prime Minister Ghozali sought to
ready the public for a cutback in government subsidies that would result in
higher prices. He also prepared the citizenry to accept the sale of part of the
nation's long-prized and fiercely guarded hydrocarbon wealth to foreigners
(whom the public had been trained to regard as "colonialists") in order to raise
the funds needed to "break out of this infernal cycle of borrowing, paying
debts, and investing less and less in our economy."9 Further economic reforms
included ending the import and distribution monopolies that had made the
Algerian market unattractive to foreign trade.10
Undertaking these extensive reforms was risky. The reforms promised
long-term benefits but still required painful sacrifices from a population in
which almost 60% lived below the poverty line" and the average income was
only $2,600." - High unemployment accompanied by a lack of prospects for
change generated distrust of government programs and left hundreds of
thousands of discontented citizens, many of whom were young and radical,
with nothing better to do than roam the streets and feed on each other's
desperation and anger.
13
Despite the initial optimism for successful economic reform, the economy
6. The government created the nation's economic crisis. See Entelis, supra note 1, at xii ("Although
an impressive state-dominated, technologically advanced infrastructure was created, it was achieved at
enormous social, economic, and political cost.").
7. Bradford Dillman, Transition to Democracy in Algeria, in STATE AND SOCIETY, supra note I, at
31, 38 (articulating new conception of state as regulator rather than as producer); Robert Pollin &
Alexander Cockburn, The World, The Free Market, and the Left: Capitalism and Its Specters, THE NATION,
Feb. 25, 1991, at 224, 225 (citing Economics Minister Ghazi Hidouci).
8. William B. Quandt, The Middle East in 1990, FOREIGN AFn., Winter 1991, at 49, 61. Algeria's
leaders prior to the election were aware of the challenges they faced. Early in 1991, Prime Minister
Mouloud Hamrouche also expressed a desire for controlled change:
The Arab world has no answers to contemporary problems .... It is at an impasse. There's
no democracy, no freedom of expression. Regimes can maintain order, yes. But what is the
basis of these regimes? Today we want to build real power on the basis of the popular will.
Louise Lief, Battling for the Arab Mind, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 21, 1991, at 22, 23-24. In July
of the same year, as the first round of elections was being scheduled, Prime Minister Ghozali expressed
his concerns about the challenge of building democracy "with empty banks," and the associated problem
of convincing restless and idealistic youth that painful "economic reforms are not incompatible with social
justice." Youssef M. Ibrahim, In Algeria, Hope for Democracy But Not Economy, N.Y. TIMEs, July 26,
1991, at AI, A6 [hereinafter Ibrahim, Hope for Democracy].
9. Ibrahim, Hope for Democracy, supra note 8, at A6 (quoting Prime Minister Ghozali).
10. Cherie Loustaunau, Near East and South Asia Offers Good Prospects If You Know Where to Look,
Bus. AM., Apr. 22, 1991, at 20, 20.
11. Wright, supra note 4, at 134.
12. Id.
13. Ibrahim, Hopefor Democracy, supra note 8, at Al, A6. In addition, the workforce comprised only
20% of the population due to the high number of youth and low number of women participating in the paid
labor force. FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, THE AMERIcAN UNIVERSITY, ALGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 172-73
(Harold D. Nelson ed., 1985) [hereinafter FOREIGN AREA STUDIES].
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worsened. Annual inflation in 1991 approached 100%, and the nation
experienced negative economic growth in 1990 and 1991 as the Gross
Domestic Product declined by more than two percent each year.14 At the time
of the elections, Algeria's foreign debt totaled more than $26 billion. 5 Such
high debt led to insufficient funds to purchase needed food, medicine, raw
materials, and equipment, or to address housing, education, and social services
needs.16 In addition, the population grew faster than the economy, resulting
in a further reduction in per capita income.
1 7
High unemployment and widespread poverty, along with a general feeling
of disenfranchisement from political power and resentment of government
corruption, contributed to the emergent FIS's growing popularity just as similar
problems a few decades earlier had contributed to popular discontent with
French rule. 8 Where the Algerian government offered only ineptness and
corruption, the FIS offered hope, explanations for the meaning of life, material
assistance, and freedom from corruption.' 9
B. Algeria's First Multiparty Elections in 1990 for Local Offices
The failed economic reforms and resulting economic crisis led in 1988 to
an outburst of popular discontent, now known as "the events of October 8,"
in which demonstrators protested the sudden price increases and cutbacks in
public expenditures caused by the free-market adjustment programs.20 After
initial hesitation, the Army crushed the demonstrations.
21
President Benjedid remained committed to reform despite these setbacks
and instituted a process of democratization resulting in the adoption of a new
Constitution on February 23, 1989, that permitted the formation of opposition
parties. 22 Algeria's first multiparty municipal elections were scheduled for
14. Algeria: No Growth in the Shadow of the Gun, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Dec. 25, 1992, at 21,21;
Algeria: Another Year of Living Dangerously, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Dec. 27, 1991, at 8, 8 [hereinafter
Living Dangerously]; Jon Marks, Algeria: Reforming the Reforms, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Aug. 2, 1991,
at 10; see also JOHN RUEDY, MODERN ALGERIA: THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NATION 247
(1992) (noting negative growth of GDP in 1987 and 1988).
15. Ibrahim, Hope for Democracy, supra note 8, at A6. An exceedingly burdensome 71.2% debt
service ratio in 1991 was scheduled to fall to less than 40% in 1994 if a debt restructuring plan had
proceeded as scheduled. Living Dangerously, supra note 14, at 8.
16. See generally Capitalism Comes to the Casbah, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 21, 1989, at 16 (describing
shortages caused by debt).
17. In 1990, Algeria had a 2.7% population growth but only a 0.7% real GNP growth. In contrast,
the population of Turkey, which has had success with democracy, grew only 2.2% while its real GNP grew
5.3%. Turkey: Star ofIslam, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 1991, at 3, 3.
18. Robert Mortimer, Islam and Multiparty Politics in Algeria, 45 MIDDLE E. J. 575, 585 (1991).
19. See infra part V.A.2.
20. Rapid social change in Algeria only worsened under Benjedid. The government's failure to deliver
a "better life" and Algeria's failure to reach consensus on the foundation of its culture - Islam or
secularism - combined to fuel discontent. RUEDY, supra note 14, at 239.
21. Torture was used extensively in crushing the riots and dealing with those arrested. However,
President Benjedid publicly condemned such actions and attempted to punish those responsible, with the
result that torture was effectively non-existent in Algeria immediately preceding the coup. AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, ALGERIA: DETERIORATING HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY 8 (Al
Index: MDE 28/04/93, Mar. 1993) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L].
22. RUEDY, supra note 14, at 250-52 (discussing new constitution). The constitution, Ato. CONST.,
reprinted in CONSTIrunoNs OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz
eds., 1990), received a 73% favorable vote in the referendum adopting it Chronology 1989, FOREIGN AFF.,
1995]
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June 12, 1990. At this time, many Algerians and foreign diplomats expressed
hope that the new openness evident in Benjedid's response would lead to the
first truly democratic elections in an Arab state. Such elections would contrast
sharply with the "benign feudal governments and dictatorships" that theretofore
had dominated the region.'
For many people, both in Algeria and around the world, this openness
soon took a disturbing path as the fundamentalists demonstrated their power.
The FIS organized quickly and attracted widespread support. Thousands of FIS
supporters marched in April of 1990, demanding national parliamentary
elections and an Islamic state. In response, members of four secular opposition
parties staged a march the following month to denounce fundamentalism and
call for democracy.24 The most significant of these secular parties was the
Front for Socialist Forces ("FFS"), which was to finish second in the 1991
parliamentary elections.25
The FIS sweep of the municipal elections in June represented the first time
a fundamentalist Islamic movement had won considerable power in a
government by nonviolent, democratic means.26 The FIS received 54% of the
vote, gaining control of thirty-two of the forty-eight provincial (wilyat)
councils and 850 of the 1540 municipal councils.2 Ironically, a boycott of the
elections by the other opposition parties gave the anti-government opposition
vote wholly to the FIS and thus contributed significantly to its victory.s
C. The FIS Victory in the 1991 Parliamentary Elections
The FIS's victory in the municipal elections forced President Bendjedid
to call national parliamentary elections, which he originally set for June 27,
1991.29 The election announcement created a three-way split within the
Fall 1990, at 213, 253.
23. Ibrahim, Hope for Democracy, supra note 8, at Al.
24. RUEDY, supra note 14, at 244.
25. Another party, the Rally for Culture and Diversity ("RCD"), opposed both the discredited National
Liberation Front and the Fundamentalists and thereby demonstrated the deep divisions in Algerian society.
Led by a charismatic psychiatrist, Dr. Saeed Saadi, the RCD reminded Algeria of its "Berber problem."
It draws strength from the 20%-30% of Algerians who consider themselves Berber rather than Arab, oppose
the view held by the government and by the Fundamentalists that Algeria is an Arab nation, want to retain
their Mediterranean and especially their French heritage, and support secularism and multi-culturalism as
the only hope for the preservation and growth of their culture and of the nation. Ibrahim, Hope for
Democracy, supra note 8, at AI, A6.
26. Dunn, supra note 4, at 18. Nevertheless, at least some in the Algerian government who believed
the Islamists would fail thought at the time that the preferable course was to "open the abscess now and
clean it up rather than to sit on millions of people who believe, rightly or wrongly, that Islam is the answer
to everything." Youssef M. Ibrahim, Militant Muslims Grow Stronger as Algeria's Economy Weakens, N.Y.
TINmIs, June 25, 1990, at AI, A8 [hereinafter Ibrahim, Militant Muslims]. Even at that time, however, some
feared an army coup if the government failed to contain the success of the FIS. Id.
27. RUEDY, supra note 14, at 253. The FIS won control in the four largest cities, Algiers, Oran,
Constantine, and Annaba. The voting was generally considered fair, as each party was allowed to position
observers at every polling place. Dillman, supra note 7, at 35.
28. See RUEDY, supra note 14, at 253; John P. Entelis & Lisa J. Arone, Algeria in Turmoil: Islam,
Democracy and the State, MIDDLE E. POL'Y 23, 30 (1992). Ironically, the other opposition parties claimed
the election rules unfairly favored the FLN and boycotted these elections.
29. Benjedid avoided pressure to call them immediately after the fundamentalists swept the local
elections because he feared their popularity at that point. When their popularity apparently waned, he called
the elections for June 27. However, he could have waited one more year, as his term did not expire until
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fundamentalist ranks. Hamas, which presented the strongest challenge to the
FIS, advocated the "co-existence of fundamentalist Muslims with other secular
parties in a democratic political structure."30 At the other extreme, more
radical factions began to call for the immediate creation of an Islamic state and
denounced the idea of elections altogether. The FIS, holding a middle position,
continued to express its desire to participate in the elections but did not go as
far as Hamas in committing to a democratic political structure.
To ensure the FLN's success in the upcoming parliamentary elections, the
FLN parliament passed blatantly biased election laws that increased the size
of parliament by adding extra seats in areas where the FLN performed well in
the municipal elections.3 1 To "polarize the options" by leaving "a choice
between a police state and a fundamentalist state," the new elections used a
two-round procedure.32 In the first round, any number of candidates could
run; if no one received a majority, a run-off election would be held between
the top two candidates from the previous round.33
The non-FLN parties were almost unanimous in opposing these measures,
largely because the procedures effectively eliminated all small parties from the
election.34 The FIS, for its part, demonstrated against the measures by
encouraging hundreds of thousands of followers to begin a general strike on
May 25, 1991, and by instigating public demonstrations in an attempt to
overthrow the government s In early June, President Benjedid dismissed the
government of Prime Minister Hamrouche, fueling speculation that the FLN
would form a coalition government with other new parties in an attempt to
oppose the FIS.36 The coalition never formed, however, and Foreign Minister
Sid Ahmed Ghozali became Prime Minister.
The tension continued nevertheless. On June 4, Jnterior Minister
Mohammedit ordered police to clear sleeping protesters from two public
1993. Some also hoped that the participation of 39 parties in these next elections would significantly
weaken FIS support. Alan Riding, Military Restores Order in Algiers, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1991, at A10.
30. Ibrahim, Hope for Democracy, supra note 8, at Al.
31. RUEDY, supra note 14, at 253; Entelis & Arone, supra note 28, at 30.
32. RuEDY, supra note 14, at 253; Mortimer, supra note 18, at 589.
33. Entelis & Arone, supra note 28, at 30.
34. Id. In addition, the FLN's declining legitimacy had led many members of the government to begin
to distance themselves from the FLN as early as July 1990, further weakening the party and leaving them
without an organized political base. Diliman, supra note 7, at 36. President Benjedid attempted to
reinvigorate the FLN, but his effort failed. Mortimer, supra note 18, at 582-83.
35. The strike called before the violence erupted was little heeded, indicating that the middle class
did not fully support the FIS and that its support remained primarily among disillusioned and unemployed
youth. Middle-class Algerians may have begun to be disillusioned by the FIS's governance of the cities it
won in 1990. See Entelis & Arone, supra note 28, at 30. However, many of the FIS's difficulties in
governing stemmed from clashes with FLN governors concerning budgets and priorities. The FLN had
every motivation to make the FIS look bad, especially since the FLN controlled most of the mass media
and could craft its message. The neighborhood charitable associations nevertheless let the people know that
the FIS officials had been deprived of the city budget. Rabia Bekkar, Taking Up Space in Tlemcen: The
Islamist Occuption of Urban Algeria, MIDDLE E. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 11, 14. Despite these obstacles,
the FIS succeeded in providing services to some districts that had not received them for years. The FIS also
delivered food, prodded the bureaucracy, and set up literacy classes. Boutheina Cheriet, The Resilience of
Algerian Populism, MIDDLE E. REP., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 9-10.
36. Benjedid probably took this action under pressure from the military. Military elites disapproved
of Hamrouche's "conciliatory" attitude toward the FIS. Entelis & Arone, supra note 28, at 32.
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squares in Algiers.37 Tens of thousands returned to protest the next day,
sparking a battle of tear gas, rocks, and bullets.38 The violence resulted in
approximately 300 deaths, 8000 arrests, including arrests of the top FIS
leaders, the imposition of martial law, and the postponement of the
elections. 39 Following this upheaval, the army announced that it would
enforce state-of-siege laws, thereby making political gatherings in the streets
illegal. and allowing the FIS's two top leaders, Madani and Belhadj, to be tried
in front of a military tribunal. 4
Notwithstanding these developments, the popular feeling in Algeria
remained optimistic and euphoric due to a sense of "expanding horizons of
freedom."'41 After the riots and the postponement of elections, the editor of
Al Watan (The Fatherland), the largest independent newspaper, predicted that
"it will be impossible for anyone to go back on democratization, free
expression, economic reforms, and free elections."4 Indeed, Prime Minister
Ghozali's cabinet selections, which included mostly non-FLN members, two
women, and a Human Rights Minister, demonstrated that reform was still on
the agenda. 43 The transitional government's promises that the elections would
be rescheduled as soon as possible and the army's promises not to stop
democratization reinforced the optimism.44
The first round of elections was rescheduled for December 26, 1991.
Western observers hoped that the approaching elections would lead to
moderation among the fundamentalists.45 They predicated this hope on the
widespread belief that the FIS would not win a majority in the upcoming
elections.' Many, blaming the FIS's success in the municipal elections of
1990 on the parties that boycotted those elections, predicted that voters would
not choose the FIS in December if given a choice of other non-FLN parties.47
The government itself expected the FIS to win only 30% of the vote because
it believed that the FIS's appeal had waned as a result of allegedly poor
administration of the towns in which it had won municipal election victories
37. Mortimer, supra note 18, at 589; Algeria: Another State of Siege, TIME, June 17, 1991, at 47
[hereinafter Siegel; John Hooper, Algeria: Several Die as Police Clash with Algerian Militants, GUARDIAN
(London), June 5, 1991, at 10.
38. Siege, supra note 37, at 47. Violence has unfortunately accompanied elections in many African
nations. See, e.g., Chronology 1991: Africa, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1992, at 222-24.
39. Algeria: Ghozali Struggles to Keep the Lid On, APR. ECON. DIG., July 15, 1991, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. The two top leaders of the FIS, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, were
jailed following the June riots along with six other senior leaders and more than 5000 adherents. Madani
and Belhadj and others remained in prison throughout the subsequent events and into the next year. The
state of siege was lifted on September 29, 1991, one week before its expiration. AMNESTY INT'L, supra
note 21, at 1.
40. Entelis & Arone, supra-note 28, at 31-32.
41. Ibrahim, Hope for Democracy, supra note 8, at A6.
42. Id.
43. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Algerian Leader Fills Cabinet Mostly With Party Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 1991, at A10.
44. Id.
45. Quandt, supra note 8, at 61.
46. See, e.g., Algeria: Security Tightened Ahead of Elections, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Dec. 20, 1991
at 9, 10 (reporting expectations of "most local analysts" that FLN would mobilize its influence and prevent
absolute FIS majority).
47. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Islamic Party in Algeria Defeats Ruling Group in Local Elections, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 1990, at Al, A20.
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two years earlier.'"
The FIS, for its part, threatened to boycott the elections because of its
imprisoned leadership and the biased election laws.4 9 The FIS only declared
it would participate on December 14, a few days before the election. This
announcement apparently indicated a victory by the moderate faction in the
FIS over the hardliners who had opposed participation so long as the FIS's two
senior leaders remained jailed.50
In the first round of parliamentary elections, 5800 candidates competed for
430 seats.5' The FIS won 188 seats, finishing first, while the long-ruling FLN
finished a distant third with only 16.52 The Front for Socialist Forces ("FFS")
finished second with 25 seats, while Hamas placed fourth.53 The FIS needed
only 28 more seats to win an absolute majority in the second round of
elections, which had been scheduled for January 16, 1992.
In response to his party's stunning victory, acting FIS leader Abdelkader
Hachani proclaimed at the EI-Sunna mosque that "[t]he party of God heralds
the victory of God," and that the FIS would "not swerve from [their] goal, to
build an Islamic state." Such proclamations may or may not have indicated
a move away from the pre-election moderate stance: Hachani balanced his
statements with calls for restraint,55 while other FIS leaders were more
strident in proclaiming that "Islam is light .... Darkness is in democracy.,
56
Many secularist Algerians feared that once the FIS gained power, it would
prohibit future elections, institute a repressive Islamic state, and disrupt
economic reforms.57 Acting on these fears, over 100,000 anti-fundamentalists
marched in downtown Algiers, and mainstream newspapers called for an army
coup d'6tat.58
48. Algeria: Islamists Take to the Electoral Trail, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Dec. 27, 1991, at 23, 24
[hereinafter Electoral Trail (reporting that various estimates predicted FIS would win 20%-40%, with one
official poll predicting 30% for both FIS and FLN); Youssef M. Ibrahim, Algerian Election Tests
Government, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 26, 1991, at A3 (citing unofficial polls by government and other
organizations that found FIS had dropped from 55% to 30%). The government also took further
precautions, including more revisions to the election laws. Entelis & Arone, supra note 28, at 33. Moreover,
the government suggested that the F1S's top two leaders might be released if they and the FIS promised
good behavior. Id.
49. Algeria: Front Islamique du Salut May Boycott General Election to Be Held on 26 December,
MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Nov. 19, 1991, at 21, 21.
50. See RUEDY, supra note 14, at 254.
51. Algeria: In Brief, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Dec. 6, 1991, at 12. Interestingly, only the FIS
possessed the organizational capacity to field 430 candidates, one in each district The FLN only managed
to field 429 candidates. Electoral Trail, supra note 48, at 24. Some FLN members who were denied
nominations decided to run as candidates for other parties, and some even ran on the FIS lists. Mortimer,
supra note 18, at 584.
52. Entelis & Arone, supra note 28, at 33.
53. Wright, supra note 4, at 135.
54. Ruth Marshall & Scott Sullivan, In Algeria, 'The Victory of God,' NEWSWEEK, Jan. 13, 1992, at
37, 37.
55. David Hirst, Algiers Bans Party Politics in Mosques, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 23, 1992, at 20.
56. Marshall & Sullivan, supra note 54, at 37.
57. For example, a new pipeline from Algeria to Spain via Morocco sponsored by the Maghreb Arab
Union (Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco) had attracted interest from major consumers in Germany, France,
and Portugal. The election results and violence threatened to destroy this interest Thomas Land,
Desperately Seeking to Reassure World, Algeria's Natural Gas Industry, PETROLEUM EONOMIST LTD.,
July 1992, at 20, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
58. Marshall & Sullivan, supra note 54, at 37.
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President Benjedid, on the other hand, apparently was more optimistic
about the probable consequences of the next election. Perhaps he had
confidence that the constitutional checks and balances would contain the FIS
in the event it came to power.59 He may have relied on the fact that the FIS
would not have an opportunity to win the presidency until late 1995. Maybe
he believed that an FIS controlled parliament could not have forced
amendments to the constitution because amendments had to be not only
approved by the Parliament, but also proposed by the President and approved
by a popular referendum. 60 In addition, if the FIS had gained control of
Parliament, the army would still have stood as a bastion of power ready to
oppose illegitimate moves by the FIS.6' For whatever reason, Benjedid's
willingness to hold the second round of elections indicated his beliefs that he
and the FIS could work together and that acceptance of the FIS victory would
not have doomed reform efforts.62 The second-place finisher in the first round
of elections, the FFS, also supported the planned elections, further indicating
domestic support for continuing the democratic process. 63 The consensus
seemed to be that free elections, even if won by the FIS, represented the best
hope for a brighter future.
D. The Coup d'AEtat
Although some Algerians were confident that democracy would continue
despite an FIS victory, the military leadership viewed that possibility as a
threat to the security of the state.' On January 11, a self-appointed and self-
proclaimed High Security Council announced its assumption of power. In the
first days of this coup d'6tat, the junta attempted to maintain some
constitutional niceties and even permitted prime minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali
to head the High Security Council. The High Security Council nevertheless
forced Benjedid to resign on January 11 and usurped the role of the seven-
person Constitutional Council that, under Algeria's constitution, should have
acted as head of state until a new president could be elected.65 On January
12, the High Security Council canceled the second round of elections, which
had been scheduled for January 16, "until necessary conditions [were] achieved
59. Under then-existing Algerian law, the President had the power to dissolve Parliament and declare
a state of emergency or a state of siege. ALG. CONST. arts. 78, 86, 120,
60. Id. art. 163. The President had considerable additional control over the executive functions of
government through his ability to appoint and dismiss the head of government and all government
ministers. Id. arts. 74, 83.
61. Algeria: Can Tanks Ever Protect Freedom?, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 14, 1992, at 18. The coup
leaders may have believed they would lose the ability to intervene as time passed because the lower levels
of the army might increasingly side with the FIS. If that possibility was real, then the army did not have
the option of waiting. Also, secular opposition to the existing regime was strong, particularly in the army.
Algeria: Editorial - Killing in a Corner, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 9, 1992, at 22.
62. RUEDY, supra note 14, at 255.
63. See David Butter, Algeria Stares into the Abyss, MIDDLE E. BUS. WKLY., Jan. 24, 1994, at 4.
64. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Rulers Taking Power in Algeria Halt Elections to Parliament, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Ibrahim, Rulers Taking Power].
65. Id.; Entelis, supra note 1, at xi. Although Article 84 of the constitution mandated that elections
be called within 45 days to replace Benjedid, ALG. CONST. art. 84, the new rulers found this rule of law,
like many others, easier to ignore than to follow.
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for the normal functioning of [state] institutions."6'
Although its leaders did call for confrontation immediately after the
cancellation of the elections, the FIS did not immediately adopt a campaign of
violence.67 These same leaders urged their followers to remain calm when
government troops were deployed on January 17 to prevent FIS supporters
from entering the capital. For example, at the Bab el-Qoed mosque, Hachani
urged his followers to exercise restraint to avoid giving the army any excuse
to crack down: "The army has a scenario for us, but it is a role we will not
play. We will not respond to provocation." 8 The FIS denounced violence
and called upon "veterans, religious leaders; thinkers, preachers, army officers,
soldiers ... and all who love wounded and struggling Algeria to close ranks
against this quisling ruling clique."69 Rather than calling for jihad, the FIS
merely requested a release of prisoners, inter-party dialogue and alliance, and
resumption of the elections. 0 Thus, the FIS still appeared committed to a
democratic process at this point.
Despite this calm initial response, the junta quickly adopted a very
hardline anti-democratic program. It abandoned all semblance of following
constitutional processes, announcing the creation of a collective presidency
under the label of the High State Council. This Council was officially headed
by war veteran Mohammed Boudiaf who had been brought back from thirty
years of exile in Morocco for this purpose. Defense Minister General Khaled
Nezzar held the real power, however.71  The military also created the
National Consultative Council, comprised of sixty respected Algerians, to
advise the High State Council in place of the national parliament, which had
been disabled.72
In addition, the junta soon arrested more FIS leaders, including acting
President Hachani.73 They banned public gatherings in and around mosques,
replaced the leaders in 40% of Algeria's 9,000 mosques, and arrested scores
of clerics.74 They even jailed Algerian journalists who reported favorably
about the FIS. 75 Within the first week alone, more than 500 FIS supporters
were arrested.76
66. Ibrahim, Rulers Taking Power, supra note 64, at Al.
67. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Fundamentalists in Algeria Ask Followers To Stay Calm, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
18, 1992, at A5 [hereinafter Ibrahim, Ask Followers]. After almost making a call to arms, FIS leaders
sought to avoid bloodshed and used language carefully chosen to appeal to Western nations. Andrew Bilski
et a]., Islam's Broadening Sweep, MACLEAN'S, Jan. 27, 1992, at 20, 20.
68. Wright, supra note 4, at 137.
69. Algeria, The Soldiers Cut In, ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1992, at 42, 42.
70. Wright, supra note 4, at 136.
71. Interestingly, although General Nezzar became the FIS's primary opponent, his appointment as
Minister of Defense in July 1990 was perceived then as a gesture to the Islamists, who considered him a
neutral figure in their political struggle with the FLN. Mortimer, supra note 18, at 590.
72. Jon Marks, Algeria: PresidentMohamedBoudiafs GovernmentSuppressesPolitical andReligious
Opposition, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., June 5, 1992, at 8, 8 (noting that Boudiaf originally asked FFS leader
Ait Ahmed to head Council, but that Ahmed refused).
73. Police in Algiers Fire at Crowd of Angry Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1992, at A5.
74. Algeria: Political Situations, LLOYDs INFO. CASUALTY REP. LLOYDS LIST, Feb. 11, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws file (reporting that over 40 imans had been arrested).
75. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 21, at 14 (reporting arrest of at least 30 journalists and suspension
or closure of at least 15 newspapers since coup).
76. Ibrahim, Ask Followers, supra note 67, at A5.
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On February 9, 1992, following disturbances in most major cities, the
army declared a twelve-month state of emergency and banned the FIS.7 7 An
administrative court ordered the dissolution of the FIS on March 4, 1992. The
government shut down newspapers published by the FIS, and universities,
which had become a focal point for protest.7 Dissolution of municipal
councils and regional assemblies controlled by the FIS followed on March 30,
along with the arrests of the FIS representatives. 79 Between 8800 and 30,000
FIS followers were sent to detention camps in the southern Sahara during the
month of March.80
Once the FIS was officially banned, a pattern of violent confrontation
between the junta and the fundamentalists quickly emerged. The FIS was
openly calling for armed resistance by the end of April.81 Thus, only a few
short months after the elections had generated such great hopes for establishing
democratic processes, both sides resorted to the use of violence to resolve
questions of power allocation.
Nevertheless, FIS leaders Madani and Belhadj received comparatively
lenient twelve-year jail sentences from a military tribunal in Blida on July 15.
This leniency may have signalled a government desire to de-escalate the
confrontations. 82 If that de-escalation was indeed the government's intention,
its signal was overshadowed by sparse evidence and unfair trial proceedings,
which prompted the defendants and their lawyers to boycott the
proceedings.83 Fundamentalist protests of the tribunal's sentences led to more
clashes and arrests in the next few days.8
On August 26, 1992, a bomb killed nine people and wounded more than
one hundred in the Algiers airport terminal. Another bomb exploded near the
Air France office downtown, and a third was defused near the Swissair
office.85 In response, a new Legislative Decree introduced tougher sentences
and other means of combating "terrorism" - and led to dramatic increases in
77. On February 7, 1993, the High State Council renewed the state of emergency indefinitely.
AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 21, at 2.
78. Algeria Suspends 3 Newspapers in Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1992, at AS; Algeria: FIS
Banned as Authorities Turn the Screw, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Mar. 13, 1992, at 11, 11 [hereinafter FIS
Banned].
79. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Algeria Tightening Rein on Fundamentalists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1992,
at A8. In April, Interior Minister Belkheir discussed dissolving 430 councils run by the FIS. Algeria:
Political Consensus Blocked as Authorities Take Hard Line, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Apr. 3, 1992, at 18,
18.
80. Wright, supra note 4, at 135. Many have been arrested and detained in camps in the Sahara
without notice of the charge against them and without notice to their families, sometimes merely for reading
FIS materials (before the FIS was banned), even though they themselves have never advocated violence.
Torture has become widespread. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 21, at 3-5.
81. Algeria's Muslims Urged to Move 'to Rifles,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1992, at A9.
82. Youssef M. Ibrahim, 2 Fundamentalists in Algeria Get Relatively Light Sentences, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 1992, at A5.
83. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 21, at 9.
84. Algeria Arrests Muslims Protesting Jail Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1992, at A3 (reporting
three dead, 15 wounded, and estimated 36 arrested in two days).
85. Blast at Algiers Airport Kills 9 and Wounds 100, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1992, at A5 (noting that
130 police and soldiers had been killed in attacks by armed Muslim bands and that FIS leaders had been
sentenced in July to up to 12 years in jail for sedition and advocating holy war against Algerian
government).
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reports of torture and other forms of government mistreatment of prisoners.86
On the economic front, tensions between President Boudiaf and Prime
Minister Ghozali prevented the formation of a comprehensive plan to deal with
Algeria's debt, inflation, and shortages.87 When Ghozali was forced to resign
on July 9, 1992, he blamed both corrupt officials and the fundamentalists for
the economic crisis and accused the government of plotting against political
and economic reform.88
As the preceding recital indicates, the decision to annul the elections and
use force to exclude the fundamentalists from their democratically earned right
to govern has had extensive destabilizing effects in Algeria. Only
nonfundamentalist Algerians have retained their cultural freedoms. The junta
has retained its power. Economic reform and development have been
paralyzed. The nation has been subject to unrelenting violence between the
police and fundamentalists. The military government, moving increasingly
away from the rule of law, has created secret courts with the authority to
retroactively increase sentences. Tens of thousands of Algerians have died, and
tens of thousands more have lost their civil liberties as the government has
institutionalized human rights violations.
The most striking example of the breakdown in stability in Algeria was
the assassination of President Boudiaf on June 29, 1992. During his first
speech outside the capital, President Mohammed Boudiaf was shot by a
member of his own security guard. No clear account of the attack emerged.
Although the fundamentalists had sufficient incentive, the Algerian leadership
also had reason to dispose of a man who had begun to act independently,
rather than as a mere figurehead. Boudiaf apparently wanted to crack down not
only on the FIS, but also on the corrupt old guard of the FLN.
89
The government added to the confusion surrounding the slaying by
releasing only an edited film of the assassination more than a week after the
incident and by declining to make specific statements about the number or
identity of the attackers. As different factions in the leadership tried to distance
themselves from the killing, the newspapers under their respective control
reported different accounts of the murder.9° Interestingly, the Associated Press
revealed that doctors at Ain Naadja military hospital reported President
Boudiaf's time of death as 4:00 p.m. even though official radio had announced
his death three hours earlier.91
The confusion of accounts and the government's lack of candor led many
Algerians to hold the Army responsible for the assassination, a belief that
86. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 21, at 5, 9 (Legislative Decree 92-03). In addition, courts began to
pass death sentences. Id. at 9.
87. Cheriet, supra note 35, at 9, 14.
88. Id.; Jackie Rowland, Algeria Picks New PM After Resignation, GUARDIAN (Manchester), July 9,
1992, at 11.
89. The month before, in May, Boudiaf began his anti-corruption campaign by bringing high-ranking
general Mustapha Benloucif to trial. See Alfred Hermida, Algeria: Algiers Unnerved by "Mafia" Links of
BoudiafKillers, OBSERVER, July 5, 1992, at 19.
90. Top Fundamentalists Said Targeted in Jail Carnage, AGENCE FRANCE, Feb. 23, 1995, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Alwid File.
91. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Algerian President Fatally Shot at Rally, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at A8
[hereinafter Ibrahim, President Fatally Shot].
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weakened popular support for suppression of the FIS. Algeria's largest
independent daily, Al Watan, boldly editorialized that "Boudiaf has been a
victim of the system. The death of Boudiaf, who fought a solitary battle for a
total break with the rotted system that has governed Algeria, has demonstrated
that 'conspiracies of the shadows' remain, unfortunately, very influential and
very powerful."
92
Boudiaf's successor, President Ali Kafi, did nothing to dispel the
suspicions. Although he quickly appointed a panel of six lawyers to conduct
an investigation, the government released only part of the panel's report. The
report drew no conclusions as to the organizers of the assassination. Instead,
it merely commented that the key question to ask was who benefited from
Boudiaf's death. The panel did not recommend taking action against the
security forces that it had earlier accused of "criminal and sinful" lapses;93
and it failed to explain how a lone gunman could kill dozens of people and
escape unharmed. Nor could the report account for other irregularities in the
security arrangements, such as why the gunman was added to the security team
at the last minute over an officer's objections that he had Islamic
tendencies.94
E. Western Response to the Coup
Many Western scholars and journalists condemned the coup and
questioned the lack of international response. The Economist said that "non-
democrats alone should cheer" at this serious interruption of the "drift towards
democracy, which is catching in all comers of the globe."95 It went on to note
that Jordan, Turkey, Malaysia, and Pakistan have all had much more success
in fighting militants by drawing them into a political system, at least in a small
way.96 Responding to the situation in Algeria, Reuters proclaimed that "it is
not clear what path a freely chosen Islamic government would have followed
in Algeria. What is clear is that by ending their democratic experiment,
Algerian authorities have opened the way to potentially greater instability and
violence." 97 The New York Times editorialized that "[w]hen Algeria's army
staged a coup in January, heading off an anticipated Islamic electoral triumph,
Washington, like other Western governments, winked."98 The Times noted
that apologists dismissed the FIS's official line promising conciliation and
economic reform and believed instead that radicals would soon have replaced
92. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Hope, Too, Is Gunned Down in Algeria, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1992, at 3.
93. Alfred Hermida, Assassination Cover-Up?, MIDDLE E. INT'L, Dec. 18, 1992, at II.
94. Id. at 12; Boudiaf Inquiry Submits First Findings, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Aug. 7, 1992, at 7, 7.
95. Algeria Retreats, ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1992, at 16, 16.
96. Id.
97. ReutersAlgeria: Frustration and Fundamentalism, THE AGE (Melbourne), July 6, 1992, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Alwld File. Newsweek stated that "[w]hat is clear is that to call off an election
because it's turning out badly for your side is very undemocratic indeed." Kenneth Auchincloss, Limits of
Democracy, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27, 1992, at 28, 30.
98. Democracy Denied in Algeria, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at A24. The New York Times also
editorialized that President Bush and his administration were "shamefully reluctant" to criticize the coup.
Algeria: Democracy Betrayed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1992, at A22.
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the moderates. 99 Other Western leaders expressed the opinion that civil war
would have been inevitable if the election results had not been overturned. 1°°
However, while the media questioned the wisdom and legitimacy of the
coup, "[m]ost western governments made little secret of their relief." This
response indicated that even "mature" democracies will support elections only
as long as the wrong guys do not win, "especially if the wrong guys are
Islamnists. ' '
The U.S. government did not condemn the coup. Rather, the United States
at first called the junta's actions constitutional but expressed "regret" about the
coup and the suspension of democratization."°2 Then-presidential candidate
Bill Clinton supported the coup, commenting that "we know that ballot boxes
alone do not solve every world problem."1 3 In closed-door sessions, the U.S.
government did express concern about human rights abuses and reiterated its
desire to see elections resume. However, the United States reportedly received
assurances that the Algerian government, in private meetings and otherwise,
proclaimed a commitment to democratization. 4
The European Community initially made only a few weak statements,
expressing "strong hope" that the Algerian authorities would take efforts to
return the country to normal life. 105 French President Francois Mitterand
weakly criticized the army's actions and called for the resumption of free
elections."°6 The chief spokesman of the French Foreign Ministry, Daniel
Bernard, completely avoided criticizing the coup by noting that "it [was] not
up to France to judge these events." 1 7  Italy and Spain were
99. Id.
100. Keeping Islamists Out of Power, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Jan. 24, 1992, at 5, 5.
101. Elections All Round, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1992, at 18, 18 (drawing sharp distinction between
governments who are democratic "shammers" - -who should be stopped - and "toddlers" - who
should be encouraged even if they do not do everything properly); see also Andrew Bilski et al., Islam's
Broadening Sweep, MACLEAN'S, Jan. 27, 1992, at 20, 20 (describing Western leaders as "conspicuously
silent"); Francis Ghiles, Algeria's Nomenklatura Clings to Power, MIDDLE E. INT'L, Dec. 18, 1992, at 19,
19 ("an audible sigh of relief went up from European capitals').
102. Wright, supra note 4, at 137. This message, along with the message in the central Asian
republics, which seemed to be as much anti-Islam as pro-democracy, will not be missed by Islamists
seeking help and trying to assess their realistic options for support.
103. Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Asserts Bush Is Too Eager To Befriend the World's Dictators,
N.Y. TmMs, Oct. 2, 1992, at Al, A21.
104. Background on Algeria, U.S. Dep't of State (Dec. 1992) (on file with author).
105. EC Governments Urge PeacefulDialogue in Algeria, Reuters, Jan. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wires File.
106. Ibrahim, Hope for Democracy, supra note 8, at A5.
107. Alan Riding, France Voices Concern on Algerian Situation, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 1992, at A7.
Gerard Longuet of the small Republican Party said, "[bletween the Islamic Salvation Front and the freezing
of democracy under the army's control, I prefer the latter." Id. A spokesman for Recours-France, an
association of French nationals who have lived in Algeria, observed that "in reality it constitutes Algeria's
last chance of saving democracy and avoiding the fatality of fundamentalist totalitarianism." Id. The
conservative newspaper Le Figaro wrote a front page editorial stating that Algeria was not ready for
democracy. While these groups are not in power, their strong support of the coup let the French
government know that it would not face domestic pressures for failing to oppose the coup; indeed, it would
face strong pressure if it was perceived as supporting the FIS. Id.
Le Monde and the left-of-center Liberation, however, both criticized the coup. Le Monde noted that
army intervention would be warranted when and ifthe FIS established fundamentalist totalitarianism, asking
"Isn't the cure worse than the malady?" Id. An Islamic leader in northern France, Amar Lasfar, complained
that the West considers democracy to be the best system for everyone "except for Arabs and Muslims."
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"noncommittal." ' Other Western governments allowed the junta to send
them representatives on official visits to explain their actions and plans. 9
Western denunciation of the coup would have lent welcome support to the
many "Arab lawyers, professors, journalists, and feminists who once looked
to leftist ideologies [but who] have gravitated to a creed of human rights as the
best way to bring democracy, development, and social justice to the
region."' 10 Unfortunately, concerns about maintaining access to oil and
containing Iran's Islamic revolution have often led the United States and
Western powers to maintain relations with established regimes and thus to
ignore human rights abuses. Such policies marginalize many former leftists
who might now be effective advocates for democracy.
11
In fact, rather than isolating the Algerian military government, Western
powers initially decided to help it. Italy bought thirty-six percent of Algeria's
natural gas exports, and France, Belgium, and Spain were also large customers
at the time of the election.1 2 While the assassination of President Boudiaf
caused concerns about Algeria's stability sufficient to call into question $460
million in expected aid from the European Community,1 European and
American banks still decided to loan a total of $1.45 billion to assist the junta
in addressing economic problems and servicing Algeria's debt." 4 Within a
few months, the new government soon signed agreements with more than 100
private banks (mostly U.S. and Japanese) to refinance its debt."15 In addition
to the financial arena, Algeria has remained welcome in other international
forums. For example, barely six months after the coup, the United States
supported Algeria's candidate, Dr. Mohammed Abdelmoumene, for the
position of Director General in the World Health Organization."1
6
. While Western democracies were generally silent, Algerian civil society
almost uniformly opposed the military's actions. This broad opposition arose
despite the anxieties many held concerning how the FIS would behave if it
were allowed to exercise parliamentary control. Elements of the FLN and other
parties that had won parliamentary seats joined the FIS in denouncing the
suspension of the constitution and demanding that the second round of voting
take place as planned." 7 The Secretary-General of the FLN accused those
who had taken over the government - many of whom had been his former
colleagues in the FLN - of violating the constitution and seizing power
108. Bilski et al., supra note 101, at 20.
109. Wright, supra note 4, at 137.
110. Lief, supra note 8, at 24. These activists and the fundamentalists are fighting against the
traditional Arab state system, although the fundamentalists reject those human rights claims that contradict
Islamic law. Id.
111. Id.
112. Land, supra note 57.
113. Ibrahim, President Fatally Shot, supra note 9 1, at AS.
114. Wright, supra note 4, at 137.
115. Murder in Annaba, THE ECONOMIST, July 4, 1992, at 37, 37.
116. Lawrence K. Altman, Head of U.N. Health Agency Is Embroiled in Battle for Re-election, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1992, at A3.
117. Elements of the FLN and the FIS found themselves linked by mutual interests for the first time.
Eventually, in October 1991, a faction of the FLN formed the Committee in Support of Political Prisoners
to support Madani, Belhadj, and other political prisoners. This collaboration marked the first formal link
of support between the FIS and the FLN. Entelis & Atone, supra note 28, at 34.
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illegally."1 8  Even the women's associations, workers' unions, and
professional groups that had called for intervention against the FIS, as well as
a number of government officials, initially refrained from giving the junta their
support n9 Former Algerian President Ben Bella criticized the military coup,
telling President Boudiaf that "the FIS is a political problem and the solution
must be political."'' The FFS leader, Hocine Ait-Ahmed, argued that the
coup would "only worsen the problems.",2' The president of the independent,
nongovernmental Human Rights Association also denounced the junta's
actions, stating that "[airmy rule is not in the interest of the country.'
2 2
Similarly, the League for the Defense of Human Rights deplored the "brutal
and unjustified interruption of the democratic process,""' and announced that
Algeria had "plunged into a level of repression never reached before."'
24
Even the FLN split into two wings: those who supported the coup remained
in the government, and those who opposed the coup entered the
opposition.'2
Il. EVALUATING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE COUP
As the preceding Part demonstrates, the junta defended the coup as a
necessary response to the actions and plans of the FIS. In order to properly
evaluate the legitimacy of those actions and plans, this Part will examine the
proper role of Islamic belief within a society that aspires to democratic,
pluralistic ideals.
Of course, comparing the coup to the impossible ideal of a perfect
democracy, or even to the ideal of a relatively mature democracy like the
United States, is a misleading and harmful comparison. Algeria is an Arab
state, a non-Western society, and a developing nation. Thus, Algeria and other
Arab nations adopting democracy will develop a form of democratic
governance that is unique and that incorporates their Arab and Islamic cultural
history and background, just as Western democracy reflects our Greco-Roman
and Judeo-Christian secular heritage. In fact, a powerful cultural force
throughout the Arab world during the past several centuries has been precisely
the desire to discover how to borrow demonstrably effective Western ideas and
institutions without surrendering or losing the Islamic and Arab culture and
heritage that provide a sense of identity, self-worth, and connection to the past
and future.
To help determine whether governance by the FIS would, in fact, have
been incompatible with democracy, this Part will explore the relationship
118. Id.
119. Youssef M. Ibrahim, 3 Algerian Parties Demand Elections Be Restored, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1992, at A5.
120. FIS Banned, supra note 78, at 11.
121. Ibrahim, Rulers Taking Power, supra note 64, at A10.
122. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Algerian Leaders Form New Council, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1992, at A5.
123. Lofti Belhadi, West Must Help Democracy in Algeria, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1992, at A14 (letter
to editor by President of North African Students for Freedom).
124. Algeria: Concern Rises About Human Rights, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Mar. 6, 1992, at 10, 10.
125. See Juan Goytisolo, Algeria in the Eye of the Storm, NEW STATESMAN AND Soc'Y, Aug. 19,
1994, at 22, 22.
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between fundamentalism and democracy. Section A will discuss the problem
of defining government goals in a pluralistic society. Majority and minority
rights will be the focus of Section B. Section C will discuss the role of
religious belief in society, and Section D will briefly examine Islamic
jurisprudence in light of pluralistic goals.
A. Problems Presented by Pluralism
The determination of societal goals is difficult even in a highly
homogeneous society. The difficulty increases with the degree of pluralism
because different social groups often have incompatible visions of a good
society.126 Significant policy choices will be made on the basis of such
visions. Persons living in a pluralistic society therefore care deeply about the
choice of their political leaders and the goals the government strives to
achieve.127
Fundamentalistsse and secularists often seek the same goals, such as
enhanced security, deterrence of aggression, economic security, social justice,
and the promotion of certain values. 129 Because these groups view the
underlying realities of the world differently, however, they often differ about
the best path to follow to attain their common goals. For instance, both believe
that many human ills are attributable to the misuse of power. Secular
democrats seek a solution to this problem in a system of effective checks and
balances on governmental leaders. Some influential Islamic scholars, on the
other hand, have argued that the source of injustice is the power of humans
over other humans, and therefore that society must rely on the sovereignty of
Allah rather than on the democratic sovereignty of the people .
30
Religion arouses strong passions precisely because it addresses
fundamental questions of life. At the same time, a pluralistic society cannot
exist in peace unless its members agree on certain basic rules. Foremost among
these rules are those concerning the allocation and the limitation of power. Not
surprisingly, some elements within the Islamic fundamentalist movement
challenge Western democratic views on these issues of power.
31
The elites in Algeria kept the FIS from assuming power and excluded it
126. Nevertheless, such agreement is essential. "Without general agreement on the shape of the
cultural system and its values, national integration at all levels is in jeopardy." RUEDY, supra note 14, at
224 (discussing conflict of values between European-educated revolutionary leaders and Islamic masses and
mentioning governmental efforts to control dissident Muslim voices).
127. For a discussion of the constitutive process of authoritative decisionmaking and the process of
specifying and choosing alternatives, see generally HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDoUOAL,
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 728 (1992).
128. The term "fundamentalism" usually carries a negative connotation, especially for Westerners
discussing Islam. This negative connotation is directed at political views that often include a preference for
an authoritarian structure of government. Similarly, the term "secularist" often carries a positive connotation
that implies full compatibility with democracy. However, as the junta has amply demonstrated, a secular
government can be as repressive and authoritarian as a government based on any other belief system. See
infra parts U.D, V.
129. Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, The U.S., Islam, and the
Middle East in a Changing World, Speech delivered at the Meridian House, Washington, D.C. (June 2,
1992) (listing these goals as "broad policy goals of the United States") (transcript on file with author).
130. Dunn, supra note 4, at 20 (discussing teachings of Sayyid Qutb).
131. See Entelis & Arone, supra note 28, at 28.
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from the political process. The impetus for this exclusion was a fear that FIS
governance would do to them what they have done to the fundamentalists:
exclude them from power, impoverish them, and impose on them a value
system they find abhorrent. Unless a ruling group accepts that other groups
built around different belief systems can legitimately participate in government,
the basic ideal of peaceful coexistence in a pluralistic society may be
impossible to attain. Because no group will accept exclusion, a functioning
pluralistic democracy must provide theoretical justifications for and practical
protection of basic minority rights.
B. Balancing Majority Rights Against Minority Rights
Modem democratic theory rests on two principles that are constantly in
tension: the right of the majority to have its voice obeyed, and the right of the
minority to have certain fundamental rights protected from majority
oppression. 132 Western governments generally have interpreted the events of
the coup as a choice between supporting majority rights (democracy and the
winners of an election) and supporting minority rights (including, purportedly,
the certainty of future elections and individual autonomy). As discussed in Part
IV, this second choice did not in reality exist because the junta has
demonstrated no commitment to holding future elections or protecting basic
civil rights. Moreover, the hesitant international response reveals the tension
inherent in defining that core set of minority rights that are not open to
political debate.
Each minority right limits the sovereignty of the majority, that right to not
be restricted or controlled by a minority, which is exactly what a democratic
revolution is all about. When the population - the majority and the
minority - share the same world view, the same epistemology, the same
values, such limits cause only minor irritation at the margins. In that case, the
scope of those minority rights is generally agreed to, both because most
everyone has an essentially identical analytical approach and because all
acknowledge that ex ante, before the conflict, they would have regarded such
rights as protecting their own best interests in a future in which they could not
be certain beforehand whether they would be in the majority or the minority.
In the face of true moral pluralism, however, when there exists within a
society two or more fundamentally different conceptions of ultimate reality, of
what is right, and of how to determine what is right, these conflicts cease
occurring only at the margin and begin to occur in critical areas, such as
women's suffrage and the legitimacy of using violence to overcome defeat at
the polls. Adopting an ex ante view is difficult for two reasons: First, basing
analysis on different fundamental views may well lead to different ex ante
conclusions about the proper ground rules. Second, the division is often along
ethnic or religious lines, which change slowly, so that those who in the future
132. Mortimer, supra note 18, at 576. Besides majority rule, democracy requires "values of tolerance,
civil rights for minorities, and the protection of basic freedoms which are still relatively untested in
Algeria." Id.
133. See infra part n.E.
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will be the majority and the minority are already identified to themselves and
others, thus prompting the majority to seek more restrictions on the minority
than it would if it truly feared becoming the minority, and prompting the
minority to seek more rights than it would want to grant a minority if it were
someday to become the majority.
Balancing minority and majority rights requires a clear vision of the right
of minorities to veto certain majoritarian instincts. Although establishing a
clear definition of minority rights is extremely difficult, the need for one has
become more urgent as the peoples of the world have increasingly come
together into a common community.'" No longer is the world composed of
distinct, isolated, self-sufficient, and autonomous sovereign states beyond the
reach of international interference.1 35 Instead, it is increasingly viewed as one
community in which the human rights of each citizen ought to be protected
regardless of international boundaries.136 The convergence of these two
trends - the increasing linkages between nations and the new focus on
individual rights - has increased the need to define those core minority
rights. By increasing the level of interaction between people with different
moral belief systems, this convergence has also increased the difficulty of
agreeing on any definition of minority rights.
137
A brief examination of the conflicts between the fundamentalists and the
secularists in Algeria thus serves as a useful preliminary to an evaluation of
the coup. The Islamists claimed that the combination of religious freedom and
majority rule allowed them to legislate in accordance with their beliefs even
though their beliefs may have conflicted with the rights of others. The
secularists, on the other hand, claimed that the mere threat of such impositions
justified the practices that restricted the freedom of the Islamists by restricting
their rights to worship, assemble, and speak.
134. See, e.g., Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Comparative Religion: Whither -and Why?, in THE HISTORY
OF RELIGIONS 31, 33 (Mircea Eliade & Joseph M. Kitagawa eds., 1959). Balancing minority and majority
rights also creates a clash between an emerging "world culture" and individual "national cultures." John
P. Entelis, Introduction to STATE AND SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 6.
135. This was the statist view of sovereignty. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Hwnan
Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 869 (1990). Professor Reisman defines
the proper view of sovereignty as "the continuing capacity of a population freely to express and effect
choices about the identities and policies of its governors." Id. at 872.
136. Id.
137. The problem of religious pluralism has always existed. The world historically has handled
religious differences through force, as demonstrated by the persecution which led the Pilgrims to America,
the forceful imposition of Catholicism in South America, the Crusades, and the bitter fighting in India
between Hindus and Muslims. Until recently, it was more or less possible to divide the world
geographically so that each geographic unit was more or less homogenous - or at least subject to the
control of one religious group. In that world, only elites needed to encounter and deal with religious
pluralism. In the modern world, however, with the conception of individual autonomy and with increasing
international travel, migration, and commerce, encounters with religious pluralism have become much more
common in everyday life. Moreover, these encounters occur within a society, not between societies. These
factors, especially concern for individual autonomy, have given religious minorities the social power
necessary to demand accommodation rather than expulsion or repression.
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C. The Role of Religion in Society
Any discussion of Islamic fundamentalism requires consideration of the
role of religion in society. This discussion is difficult, first, because the term
"religion" is inherently ambiguous) 38 Defining religion and religious beliefs
is an especially difficult task for the West, where social sciences have
generally ignored or been hostile to the dynamic vitality of religion in the lives
of countless individuals. 19 Consequently, theories addressing democracy and
social problems have failed to provide an integrated understanding of how
religion affects social interactions and shapes political views.14
Second, examining the proper role of Islamic fundamentalism within a
pluralist society is difficult because many people in modem secular societies
claim to live without religion. 4 As they do not view their belief system
with traditional religious labels, discussing such people is difficult because of
a curious absence of appropriate vocabulary. For lack of a more well defined
term, this paper uses the term "secularist" to broadly refer to this whole range
of modem belief systems.
The lack of definitional precision regarding religion and the difficulty in
determining the proper hierarchy of rights would be of less concern if
international law had established an institutional mechanism with a specific
mandate to protect religious liberty. Such an institution would be able to define
the relevant terms and respond to extraordinary situations, like those that give
rise to coups. Although the issue of religious freedom does come within the
jurisdiction of general human rights committees, it is often overshadowed by
138. Although no widely accepted definition exists, the travaux pr6paratoires of the Declaration on
the Elimination of Intolerance and All Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief indicate the drafters'
understanding that "religion" includes "theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs." Donna J. Sullivan,
Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious
Intolerance and Discrimination, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 487, 491 & n.17 (1988) (quoting UN Doc. E[3925,
Annex, at 1, 3-4 (1964); 1978 UN ESCOR Supp. No. 4, at 62, UN Doc. F/1978t34).
139. For an example of recent discussion of this historical trend, see Ellen K. Coughlin, Social
Scientists Again Turn Attention to Religion's Place in the World, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 1, 1992, at
A6, A6 (noting that behaviorism and positivism wrongly assumed that religion would disappear in modem
science-based civilization); Martin E. Marty, Explaining the Rise of Fundamentalism, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Oct. 28, 1992, at A56, A56. Marty claims that three biases inhibit understanding of
fundamentalists: first, a bias against studying religion that causes most modem scholars to spend their
career fighting or ignoring religion; second, a belief that movements are outmoded and dying out and thus
are not relevant to addressing problems of today and tomorrow, even though empirical evidence
demonstrates that movements are growing; and third, a disapproval or abhorance of fundamentalist goals
that blinds scholars to the "fearful, law-abiding, well-intending citizens... whose own cries of pain and
shouts of resentment deserve a hearing." Id.
140. Coughlin, supra note 139, at A8 (discussing how academics such as Stephen Warner at
University of Illinois at Chicago and Robert Wuthnow at Princeton are studying how to measure religion's
influence in society and to devise theory of modernization that accounts for religion).
141. Algeria is not alone in facing this conflict. A similar competition for power has repeatedly
occurred in the United States. For scores of years, the United States was in effect a Protestant democracy,
i.e., a democracy in which public discourse was more or less limited to views based on the philosophical,
religious, and economic assumptions of the prevailing Protestant belief system. Sometime in the twentieth
century, probably in the 1960s, the United States became a secular democracy, as adherents to secular belief
systems became the cultural elites and public discourse came to exclude traditional religious viewpoints.
The recent rise of the religious right has renewed discussion of the need for American democracy to
accommodate both belief systems. Unlike the situation in Algeria, however, the competition in the United
States has taken place in a setting where both groups generally accept the system of democracy and reject
the idea of adopting an authoritarian form of government or of using violence to attain political change.
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violations against free speech, personal security, torture, etc. Indeed,
commentators generally assert, without explanation, that religious rights must
give way to other human rights.
1 42
Some, including some members of the FLN, blame religion for many
world conflicts and thus seek to banish religion to a merely private role so that
it does not claim a place in political affairs. 43 Yet, these exclusionary
attempts are based on a false view of the danger of the interaction of religion
with political life. In fact, studies have shown that formal relationships
between religious and governmental organizations do not bear any apparent
causal connection to government violations of human rights. Indeed, these
studies also demonstrate that much of the tension in the world today can be
traced to the fact that followers of traditional religions perceive themselves to
be deprived of "recognition, full dignity, and equality - three values that
many modem political and legal systems do not readily concede to religious
forces.'
This exclusionary view seeks to adopt a very restrictive role for religion,
a role that effectively belittles the sincerely held views of other people
concerning fundamental conceptions of causality, cosmic order, and human
purpose. Moreover, it defines terms in a way that protects the speaker's views
on those same subjects from exclusion.'
45
In keeping with their belief that they have divorced themselves from all
"religious" beliefs, many such secularists argue that public policy discussions
should include their own fundamental views of life but exclude the
142. While these other human rights are all-important, the tendency to always choose other values
over religious freedom provides religious believers with little reason to expect protections such as that
contained in Article 29 of the Universal Declaration. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HuMAN RIGHTS LAW-
MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 155 (1986) (expressing his opinion that goal of obtaining women's
equality may well require encroachment on religious freedom); Arcot Krishnaswami, Study of
Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.21200/Rev.l (1960),
U.N. Pub. No. 60.XIV.2, reprinted in II N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 227, 234 (1978). But see Roger S.
Clark, The United Nations and Religious Freedom, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 197, 210 (1978)
(expressing opinion that society should not rely on law to suppress all religious intolerance because such
laws "may conflict with other legitimate human rights objectives"); Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance
of the Religious Clauses, 102 YALE LJ. 1611 (1993) (arguing that religious arguments ought to be
excluded from policy discussions, but that this restriction must be balanced with religious exemptions from
otherwise generally applicable laws).
143. This Article at times draws a distinction between religious freedom, viewed primarily as an
individual right, and the relationship between government and religious organizations, both of which are
means by which individuals, exercising their rights, relate to other individuals and to other groups of
individuals. In a large, complex society, many individual interests are expressed and protected only through
groups. The National Rifle Association and other PACs and special interest groups are naturally formed
to focus on a select issue (or issues) shared by many members of society and to bring these interests before
the body politic. In the same way, individuals form religious organizations (and even political parties in
a society with numerous small special interest parties) to bring their specific interests before the body
politic.
144. James A.R. Nafziger, The Functions of Religion in the International Legal System, in THE
INFLUENcE OF RELIGION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1991);
Sullivan, supra note 138, at 487.
145. Islam has encountered other ideas that sought to limit it to "private" life. Islamic philosopher
Mohammed Iqbal concluded that nationalism "comes into conflict with Islam only when it begins to...
demand[] that Islam should recede to the background of a more private opinion and cease[] to be a living
factor in national life." Zeenath Kausar, Dynamics of Islamic Polity, 36 ISLAMIC Q. 100, 111 (1992).
Democracy, capitalism, and other Western concepts encounter the same form of resistance when they seek
to supersede Islam as the most fundamental principle of some area of public life.
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fundamental views of their religious opponents.1 6 Some secularists,
including members of the FLN, thus seek to constrict religion to a private
sphere 47 so that it does not claim a place in political affairs. 148 Such an
exclusionary view seeks to limit the "acceptable" definition of "religion" to
one that is pietistic; i.e., focused exclusively on the individual's personal
relationship with God, and therefore completely private. 14  Also, by merely
focusing on labels, this approach overlooks the fact that traditional "religious"
views and modem "secular" views often serve the same functional purpose
150
in people's lives and refuses to accept that the political system should thus
treat them the same way.P1 Ultimately, a nation must commit to some
pattern of justification in order to choose its goals and act on them. To allow
"nonreligious" arguments but forbid "religious" arguments is to make a
146. Having no empirical proof of the existence of a god or of revealed truths, many people in
modem societies have chosen - explicitly or implicitly - to guide their actions on the basis of belief
systems that do not derive ethics from divine commands and that are thus effectively agnostic. This world
view unsurprisingly leads to different ethical conclusions than one which incorporates belief in various
divine revelations regarding ethics. Because of this conflict in basic world views, some observers have
concluded that, whereas much of the twentieth century was focused on the conflict with socialism, "[flor
the future it is not implausible to predict that.., the tension between tentative versus dogmatic attitudes
will become one of the most polarizing forces within the world community." McDOUGAL sT AL., HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 688 (1980).
147. For one such proposal, see Lahouari Addi, Algeria's Democracy Between the Islamists and the
Elite, MIDDLE E. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 36, 36. Addi, a sociology professor at the University of Oran,
argues that human rights are "premised on the 'private' character of religion." A U.N. special rapporteur
appointed for further study expressed concern that "the intransigence of extremist elements and their
demand for a literal interpretation, without consideration of the context of certain religious precepts, is at
the root of many of the current manifestations of religious conflicts in the world ... [and has] become a
destabilizing factor in the international system .... Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination
of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Commission on Human
Rights, 46th Sess. paras. 103-04, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/46 [hereinafter Elimination] (report by Special
Rapporteur Angelo Vidal d'Almeida Ribero). The representative of the International Association for the
Defense of Religious Liberty has also expressed concern over "the serious threat posed by the rise of
secular and religious fanaticism." Summary Record of the 46th Meeting, Comnission on Human Rights,
47th Sess. para. 190, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/SR.46.
148. This secular fear of being governed by a different value system is functionally equivalent to the
FIS's belief that rule by an infidel is blasphemous, and indeed to every religious argument that advocates
a theocracy on the basis that those particular religious values are necessary to achieve a good society. Both
the religious and the secular arguments essentially reject moral pluralism within politics as untenable.
149. For a discussion of a contrary view, see Sullivan, supra note 138, at 500. Sullivan states that:
[m]any religious doctrines or beliefs dictate standards of social conduct and responsibility, and
require believers to act accordingly. For those adherents who follow such precepts of social
responsibility, the distinction between religious and political activities may be artificial.
Id.
150. Although nonbelievers of a particular religion or world view may regard many traditional beliefs
as simply "wrong" (whether they are beliefs about religion or communism), a democracy adopts policy not
because it is right, but because it has majority assent In addition, lack of empirical proof of a religious
proposition or assumption is not the same as empirical disproof for that proposition or assumption. It is a
logical error to assert that a policy choice should not be made because it is based on an unproven (but not
disproven) religious assumption, only to replace it with a policy choice founded upon an equally unproven
(but not disproven) agnostic or secularist assumption.
151. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993) (arguing that religion
should never be restricted qua religion, but only because of conflict with secular purpose in which state
has compelling interest). This view accords with one interpretation of one prong of the Lemon test, which
requires that all government action be capable of justification by reference to secular principles. Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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distinction where no difference exists.'52
In addition to these conceptual difficulties of defining religion and
acknowledging its role in a pluralistic society, the presence of Islamic
fundamentalism in Algerian society also leads to more practical concerns. One
such problem involves balancing religious rights with other individual rights.
Restrictions on the ability to engage in religiously motivated actions often
result in restrictions on religious freedom' 53 or other human rights, such as
the rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and association. 1" Of course,
religious norms themselves often conflict with norms of freedom espoused by
competing groups. For example, an edict against pornography is contrary to
some people's notion of free speech. Only a balancing of the factors that
produce competing norms can resolve such conflicts. 155
In Algeria, however, the actions of the junta clearly and impermissibly
restricted the power of religious institutions. Outlawing a religious party,
imprisoning its religious leaders, prohibiting activities at religious centers, and
stationing armed patrols around them all have chilling effects on religious
freedom.' 56 Even before the arrival of the junta, President Boudiaf had
already attempted to control the FIS through restrictions that target religious
practice by declaring that "using the mosques and using religion for political
purposes is unacceptable because the mosques are for worship." ' 7 This
statement, echoed in sentiment by others in Algeria and in the West, implies
that religious justifications are per se illegitimate in politics and that therefore
religious institutions ought to distance themselves from the political arena.
The FIS properly challenges this intolerant and incoherent notion.
A second observation on the role of religion in society is the powerful
impact religious institutions have as advocates for, and instruments of, political
and social change. Limits on the right of religious institutions to enact such
changes are difficult to define. Of course, discussing the issue merely in terms
of "rights" obscures a vital point. Religion is not simply a harm that is
practiced by a minority, with no benefit to society. Rather, religion has proven
throughout history to be one of the most effective means of inculcating a sense
152. But see Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611
(1992).
153. Sullivan, supra note 138, at 499. Sullivan states that although governments often try to justify
such actions by portraying those claiming religious rights as insincere believers, "governmental violations
of religious freedoms and persecution of religious leaders and groups under the pretense of restraining
impermissible political activity are far more prevalent than is the use of a religious identity to camouflage
actions motivated by purely partisan political concerns." Id.
154. Elimination, supra note 147, at para. 106 ("Mhe infringement of the rights and freedoms
embodied in the Declaration usually results in the infringement of other human rights ....").
155. Sullivan, supra note 138, at 510-11. For a general discussion of the "difficult and delicate
question" of determining which practices unreasonably intrude upon the rights of others, see MCDOUOAL
ET AL, supra note 146, at 662.
156. The ideal of the rule of law, which has been denied in Algeria, seeks to avoid this damage. See
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pmbl., para. 3 ("Whereas
it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny
and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.").
157. Tony Walker, Algeria Bans Mosque Politics, THE AcE (Melbourne), Feb. 5, 1992, available In
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
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of rectitude. 58 Without rectitude, without occasional self-sacrifice for the
common good, communities cannot hold together, trust each other, or provide
the quality of life that all seek. Religious freedom is thus vital not only to the
religious believers, but also to the community as a whole.
Third, one's view of the proper role of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria
depends on one's view of the proper role of government. One perspective
holds that the ultimate goal and duty of the government is to promote
individual security.159 Individuals need security from external aggressors,
from their own government, and from intolerant individuals within their
communities. A second perspective views the primary goal of government to
be the creation of a strong economy. Implicit in the "good" seen in this goal
is the assumption that economic satisfaction is a necessary prerequisite to
peace and security. A third perspective, that of the FIS and other
fundamentalists, views the purpose and duty of government as encouraging,
creating, and maintaining a proper relationship between the community and
God. 6 Inherent in this vision of the "good" is the belief that people who
have a proper vertical relationship with God will have proper horizontal
relationships with their fellow humans.'
61
The first two perspectives tend toward considering law and government
as the creators of rights that can be asserted against the state, other individuals,
and interest groups. In contrast, the third perspective tends toward considering
government as the enforcer of discipline, defined as a normative vision of what
is proper.' 62 This latter vision, common to communist regimes and
theocracies, raises the pertinent question of whether a government can enforce
a normative vision and remain democratic.
For paradigmatic adherents to traditional theistic religions ("theists"),
158. Consider, for example, the many people throughout the centuries who have been motivated by
their religious beliefs to fight against, inter alia, poverty, disease, war, and slavery. For a discussion of the
concept of "rectitude" in the functioning of society, see HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL,
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 864 (1992) (defining
rectitude as "a sense of responsibility for bringing the conduct of society and of the individual into
conformity with the ideal of human dignity"). In an earlier work, Lasswell defined rectitude as "the
cultivation of a sense of individual responsibility for evaluating all personal or collective policies in terms
of their compatibility with the goal of human dignity." ARNOLD A. ROGOW & HAROLD D. LAssWELL,
POWER, CORRUPTION, AND RECTITUDE 122 (1963).
159. See generally HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935).
160. Madani and others reject the Western episteme that has created a "faithless individual" who is
unaware of the omnipotence of the Creator and who is lost in the "multiplicity of interpretations of the
nature of the universe." Bouthenia Cheriet, Islamism and Feminism: Algeria's "Rites of Passage" to
Democracy, in STATE & SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 171, 178. Because of this, Western society suffers from
moral deviance and psychological disturbances. Id. They do not view the Qur'an as merely filling in gaps
of knowledge that science cannot provide, but rather as giving to mankind a necessary and otherwise
unavailable systematized and generalized ordering of human knowledge that provides guidelines for human
action and social order. Id. at 179.
161. A variant of this perspective is to view the primary obligation of government as creating a sense
of community in order to increase the peace between individuals. See, e.g., M. Scor PECK, THE
DIFFERENT DRUM: COMMUNHrY MAKING AND PEACE (1987).
162. See ABDUR RAHMAN I. DOI, SHARI'AH: THE ISLAMIC LAW 4,430 (1990). The book's summary
states the author's viewpoint in the Tribute, "the Shari'ah [is] the sine-qua-non towards man's peaceful
attachment to his creator ... [and therefore we must have] the totalitarian adoption of the Shari'ah in our
body politic. That is the triumph of education over ignorance." Id. (unpaginated tribute); see also Stanley
B. Lubman, Emerging Functions of Formal Legal Institutions in China's Modernization, 2 CHINA L REP.
195, 255 (1983).
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belief in God is the cornerstone of their world view and their understanding
of life and policy. By contrast, paradigmatic secularists orient their lives by
rejecting (and feeling morally compelled to reject) any hypothesis that is
unproven or that seems unnecessary to explain a given phenomenon.'
63
Having no direct evidence of a god, they do not include in their policy
decisions any inputs based on revelation or conceptions about God's character
and its implication for policy. As a result, although these agnostics seek
"neutrality," they generally arrive at the same policy conclusions as would the
atheist. From the perspective of the theist, therefore, the atheist and agnostic
viewpoints are functional equivalents. Thus, although the agnostic does not
consider any specific decision to have a religious character, the theist may feel
very strongly that the agnostic's viewpoint, especially on moral issues, is very
"religious" (i.e., based upon the person's core beliefs).
A belief that man is, in general, good usually accompanies the secularist's
reliance on empirical data." This belief is often accompanied by the notion
that not all impulses are evil, and that society should therefore allow their
expression unless they interfere with the rights of others. This view contradicts
that of most religions that "there is something wrong about us as we naturally
stand," which requires us to repent of our sins and suppress sinful
impulses.165 Because of our imperfect nature and moral weakness, however,
we require external controls to assist us in defeating these bad impulses.
This idea underlies the FIS's belief that society, through government
policy and law, should "assist" individuals in making right choices. 66 This
belief is not incompatible with democratic secularist societies; in fact, it
underlies our twelve-step groups and educational and legal campaigns against
the use of drugs. It also accords with our belief that children, who do not yet
perceive their own best interest, need a family or other structure to help them
learn to internalize the restraints necessary for their own enjoyment of life and
for their orderly adaptation and contribution to society. In short, the gap
between the theist's and the secularist's perspectives on the proper role of
government is not as large or unbridgeable as many assume.
People in both camps, secularists and theists, agree that a society making
policy decisions that are incomprehensible to them threatens their personal
163. See JAMES TURNER, WMOUT GOD, WrrHoUT CREED 203-25 (1985) (discussing argument that
belief is immoral).
164. The believer, in contrast, believes "there is more than meets the eye." This belief is especially
characteristic of fundamentalists, who "reject the notion that we know and believe and have our being
within time and space as the sole arena of human agency; that belief and practice is therefore historically
conditioned and contingent; and that, accordingly, as all belief systems and religions are thus bound, no
one of them holds an a priori advantage over any other in terms of cognitive truth claims." Martin E. Marty
& R. Scott Appleby, Conclusion: An Interim Report on a Hypothetical Family, in FUNDAMENTALIsM, supra
note 4, at 814, 818.
165. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIEs OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 400 (1985).
166. Two radically different conceptions of "good" are in conflict here. The secularist believes that
the best life is the life in which an individual freely chooses what makes him happy from among the widest
possible array of choices. The wide array is essential because each individual is unique. If a choice
conceivably exists, then it must be because that choice will make someone happier in some way. Therefore,
society should do all it can to give each individual the widest array of possible choices. The believer, on
the other hand, feels that what is best for every individual is to live in conformity with God's will.
Therefore, society should, to the best of its ability, help individuals avoid temptations and steer them into
the path of conformity with God.
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security. Although the citizen in a democratic society who believes in the
legalization of drugs may adamantly believe that society's prohibition policy
is foolish, he can take comfort from his belief that society has simply
misinterpreted the available factual data and hence can retain hope that a
better-educated society will act'in its own self-interest and change its policy.
Unfortunately, this hope is not available when an individual confronts a
decision made by someone utilizing a different epistemology. The secularist
woman deprived of her vote by a fundamentalist regime knows that even if she
and the FIS agree on all of the facts, they will nevertheless always reach
different conclusions unless the FIS's belief in the content of revelation from
Allah changes. Of course, another woman who fully accepts a set of religious
beliefs and bases her life on them is likely to have the same reaction when a
secularist acts in ways that contradict the clear implications of her beliefs.
Thus, both the secularist woman and the religious one can easily lose all hope
of succeeding in rational persuasion. Those left without hope are placed in a
desperate situation -and may choose violence as the only and last resort.
In general, electorates hesitate to elect people whose central world view
contradicts theirs, especially when they know the implications of that world
view will deprive them of things they value as inherent rights. The secularist
therefore fears the FIS because the conflict between their respective world
views has practical effects like the abrogation of women's suffrage. She finds
the FIS unacceptable because it would "base its policy on its religious views,"
falsely implying that the secularist's choices are not equally tied to her own
religious beliefs, i.e., her core belief system.,
The largely secular Western world has adopted a tentative world view that
it views both as essential to liberal democracy and as incompatible with
religious belief. 167 Yet, because democracy can exist in the absence of this
world view, much of the conflict is unnecessary. Even those who believe in
transcendent truth may believe that liberal democracy provides the best means
for society to understand and implement that truth. C.S. Lewis explained,
"Aristotle said that some people were only fit to be slaves. I do not contradict
him. But I reject slavery because I see no men fit to be masters. 168 In the
same way, even those who believe strongly in submitting to the will of God
may choose democracy over authoritarianism because of a conviction that no
one is worthy of exercising authoritarian rule. In sum, both theists and
secularists might be led by their beliefs to choose democracy over any other
form of government.
167. This secular conclusion follows in part from an interpretation of religious conflicts. However,
the religious conflicts from which the conclusions are drawn were based on more than religious belief.
Arguably, Calvin's Geneva and Stalin's imposition of atheism led to mass human rights abuses because
of their authoritarian structure, which lacked adequate checks against such excesses, rather than their
religious commitments. Little evidence exists of the likely outcomes of religious "establishment"
constrained by the framework of liberal democracy (unless one accepts the first century of American
democracy as an experiment in Protestant democracy which successfully and relatively peacefully gave way
to secular/agnostic democracy as the beliefs of the population changed).
Moreover, ideologies not associated with the traditional religions may have killed far more people
than religious ones. Stalin, Hitler, Mao, the American Civil War, drug and gang related murders, and
numerous other conflicts have exacted a higher cost in human life than conflicts based on traditional
religious belief systems.
168. 1-HE QUOTABLE LEWIS 153 (W. Martindale & J. Roots eds., 1989).
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D. Islamic Jurisprudence
Recent developments in Islamic jurisprudence illuminate probable
developments in FIS policy. One significant trend has been an assertion of
independence from "international law." Western legal, political, and social
cultures have always heavily influenced international law. As a result,
international law has not been universally accepted by people from other
cultures, especially Islamic ones that wish to draw upon their own extensive
legal heritage. Some Islamic elites criticize current international law as being
little more than "Western, Christian house law" and claim that it does not
incorporate the interests of all legal cultures.
169
Unfortunately, the actions of Western nations often lend credence to these
views. As Western nations seek to promote pluralism and democracy around
the world, they often insist on exporting nonfundamental features of democracy
that are only idiosyncratic reflections of Western culture. This misdirected
missionary zeal creates needless conflict and unnecessarily endangers the
growth of democracy. 170 To the extent that the spread of democracy requires
non-Western cultures to adopt new principles, these nonfundamental
democratic principles should be developed from within the non-Westem
culture. Advocating the adaption of both fundamental and derivative
democratic principles in one fell swoop risks overloading the non-Western
culture with more new ideas than it can assimilate at once.'
7'
At the same time, modem Islamic jurisprudence certainly includes some
groups whose teachings regarding democracy and the rights of non-Muslims
justifiably cause concern among non-Muslim communities. However,
evaluations of the probability of moderation within the FIS must take into
account the breadth of traditions within the Islamic community regarding
democracy and human rights and the depth of support for these rights.
172
Rich traditions within Islam speak to the legitimacy of the values encompassed
in mature democracies and provide assurances that Islam itself is not
necessarily incompatible with those values, even if some interpretations of
Islam are.
Different schools of thought have developed with differing interpretations
of the sources of authority within Islam. Some members of the Islamic
community want to reduce the complexity of these various interpretations by
169. See M.H.A. Reisman, Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Impact on International Law and Politics,
in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (Mark W. Janis ed.,
1991); Matthew M. Ricciardi, Title to the Aouzou Strip: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 17 YALE J. INT'L
L. 301, 417 (1992).
170. Even the advocacy of democracy can be viewed as inseparable from Western culture. For
example, the "neutral" principles of Western liberal democracy are often interpreted to require the
establishment of an agnostic viewpoint holding that no one can know which religion is correct. Therefore,
Western liberal democracy is seen to conclude that individual freedom of choice must be valued over the
tenets of any religious system. Many Muslims reject this view and call for the complete replacement of
Western law by the Shari'ah. See Doi, supra note 162, at 453-54.
171. For a discussion of the need to find authentically Islamic justifications for many areas of
international law, see, e.g., Reisman, supra note 169, at 122.
172. For example, McDougal notes that the world's great religions have increasingly supported
freedom of choice about religion and have become less exclusive and more tolerant. McDOuOAL ET AL.,
supra note 146, at 685.
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promoting interchange, encouraging flexibility, and closing the gaps between
the various schools of thought.173 One expression of this desire to make the
workings of the body of Islamic Law, the Shari'ah, accessible to the layperson
has been the recent upsurge in fundamentalism, which in Algeria led to the
FIS. This change represents a retrenchment and a search for clarity and
simplicity that makes the Shari'ah accessible to the nonscholar, but it
unfortunately also can lead to a loss of flexibility, diversity, strength, and depth
of understanding.
1. Islamic Views of Democracy and Pluralism
Recent advocates of an Islamic state envision rule by Muslims. This
approach is due to the strong sense of nationalism that has pervaded the Arab
world during this century and to the traditional belief that peace and prosperity
will return only when non-Muslim communities convert to Islam or submit to
Islamic authorities.174 While this approach is obviously incompatible with the
prospect of a democratic society composed of both Muslims and non-Muslims,
the Muslim community no longer universally holds this traditional point of
view. In fact, at least three primary approaches to the question of religious-
governmental relations now exist.
Building on Ali-Abdel-Raziq's 1925 work Islam and the Foundation of
Government (al-Islam wa naul al-hukon), modernists and realists argue in favor
of separating the institutions of state and religion.7 5 Traditionalists, on the
other hand, look to Orthodox historical concepts and argue that precedents
from the time of the prophet do not permit aggressive jihad and that Islam is
compatible with contemporary international law.176 Third, fundamentalists
tend to focus on "the universalism of Islam, the importance and permanence
of jihad, and the return to the initial concept of umma" in their search for the
true Islamic system.'" Depending on the definition of jihad, this
fundamentalist view could conflict with democratic ideals that renounce the use
of force as a means of persuasion or as a means of obtaining political power.
The question of the separation of the institutions of church and state
relates to the central belief of Islam, Tawheed, which is the belief in the
oneness of Allah. Tawheed is often interpreted to require an integrated unity
in all areas of life. 78 Consequently, some Muslims argue that any exercise
173. DOI, supra note 162, at 470-71 (1990). Doi mentions efforts to encourage Qadi (judges) to draw
upon all four schools in order to begin to close the gaps between them and to allow individual Muslims
to choose which school shall govern them (Takhayyur, "choice"), rather than strictly applying the rule of
Taqlid, which requires Muslims to live according to the rules of the school that governed the home into
which they were born. Takhayyur indicates both a greater range of individual autonomy and a focus more
on applying principles than on a strict application of a rigid code. Both of these developments are
compatible with Western ideals.
174. Ahmed S. EI-Kosheri, History of the Law of Nations, Regional Developments: Islam, in 7
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 221, 224 (1984).
175. Id. at 228.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Kausar, supra note 145, at 101-02 (claiming Islamic polity is "totally antithetical" to western
polity originating in "the hostile controversies between the Papacy and Kingship, which ultimately led to
bifurcation between religion and politics"); Reisman, supra note 169, at 110-11.
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of power that does not seek to fulfill divine commandments is illegitimate. '
If accepted, this viewpoint would seem to prevent Muslims from accepting a
pluralistic political structure in which democracy, rather than Islam, serves as
the fundamental constitutive principle.180 Yet, the experience of Turkey
during this century demonstrates that democracy can exist within an Islamic
state although it may differ markedly from the form of democracy familiar to
those in the West.
In considering whether Islamic thought could co-exist with the idea of
allowing non-Muslims :to participate in elections, one must note that Islamic
thought has traditionally divided the world into two camps, dar al-Islam (the
world of believers) and dar al-hurb (the world of unbelief, against whom jihad
is to be waged). Some, however, would add a third category, dar al-sulh
(territory of peace), comprising those states that have entered into peaceful
relations with Islamic states.' This third category, coupled with the strong
tradition that all covenants must be upheld, even unfavorable ones with non-
Muslims,18 2 could provide hope for Muslim participation in a pluralistic
democracy. 8 3 Covenants have traditionally been allowed when the non-
Muslims are too strong to be defeated. This would require a redefinition of the
concept of "the Muslim community" from one of statehood to one of a group
within a state. Such an interpretation could consider a covenant relation to
exist between the Islamic community (perhaps represented by one or more
Islamic political parties) and the non-Muslim community within a state.
Theoretically, the parties could not abrogate such a covenant, and the Islamic
party could therefore participate in elections without violating Islamic law.
Over time, Islamic thought has developed to recognize that multiple states
could exist with the dar al-Islam, religious affairs could be separated from the
external affairs of each state, non-Muslim sovereigns could be dealt with on
a basis of equality, and non-Muslims within a Muslim state could be exempted
from Muslim law and the poll tax." Algeria seemed like an excellent place
to foster dialogue within the ranks of modern Islamic fundamentalists about the
principle of rotating power. Because Algeria has few non-Muslims, most
candidates, including secular candidates, were likely to be Muslims. FIS
acceptance of the victory of non-fundamentalist candidates could have created
a useful precedent. Perhaps the FIS would not have willingly handed over
179. This argument arises because politics is viewed as being wholly derived from slam rather than
as an adjunct and separate institution within society. Dillman, supra note 7, at 38, 40; Reisman, supra note
169, at 11. This argument also influenced the development of Islamic political thought in another way:
all political opposition had to justify itself with religious claims because to oppose divinely supported
government was to oppose Allah himself. Id. at 111.
180. This viewpoint therefore creates a significant question of allegiance. The Muslim gives her
primary allegiance to Islam. The secularist, on the other hand, argues that an individual owes his primary
allegiance to the state, Cheriet, supra note 160, at 181, and that all other values, including religious ones,
must give way to the needs of the state. See id.
181. See EI-Kosheri, supra note 174, at 224.
182. See DOI, supra note 162, at 423-25; see also THE ISLAMIC LAW OFNATIoNs: SHAYBANI's SIYAR
154 (Majid Khadduri trans. & ed., 1966) [hereinafter SHAYBANI's SIYAR].
183. Initially, all such covenants between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb could only be
temporary; as Islam evolved, however, the covenants became indefinite in length. SHAYBANI'S SITAR, supra
note 182, at 18-19.
184. Id. at 60-65.
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power to secular Muslim winners, but as it is, they were allowed to avoid a
public decision about this issue. Given these circumstances, an assumption that
the FIS would be unwilling to govern in a democracy is arguably unjustified.
2. Islam and Human Rights
Observers have questioned whether an Islamic state is compatible with
modern human rights norms. In fact, many fundamentalists do refuse to
recognize universal human rights norms that violate Islamic law. While several
interpretations of Islam provide three distinct levels of religious freedom,
distinguishing among Muslims, Christians and Jews, and everyone else, some
argue that Mohammed himself took care to treat all people equally. 8 These
Muslims cite as evidence one instance in which Mohammed reportedly sided
with a Jew against a Muslim, according to "the strict principle of justice." '186
Furthermore, prevailing cultural values are forcing those who still argue for
distinctions based on religion and gender to demonstrate that those distinctions
do not violate norms of equality rather than merely assert that norms of
equality must yield to certain Islamic values." 7
Within the context of an Islamic state, conservative Muslim scholars claim
that non-Muslims are guaranteed the protection of their "life, property, and
honor exactly like that of a Muslim" and "enjoy all their human rights which
are enshrined in the Shari'ah."' 88 Westerners want more than equal
protection, however. Having seen how Islamic governments treat their own
people, Westerners call for a higher minimum standard of human rights for all
people within an Islamic state.
Specifically, the Shari'ah's incorporation of the death penalty for those
guilty of apostasy is especially troublesome to the concept of democracy.1 89
Modern Islamic human rights documents have failed to challenge this provision
even though traditional sources of authority in Islam do not mandate it. 90
The Qur'an, for example, proclaims the principle of "no compulsion in
religion,"'' and some modern Muslim scholars argue that twentieth century
Muslims have moved decisively towards accepting religious freedom. To
support this new liberality, they cite incidents such as a Malaysian court's
dismissal of the charge that conversion by a Muslim to Christianity is a
punishable offense.192 Western observers, while encouraged by the dismissal,
185. DoI, supra note 162, at 428.
186. See id. at 4,430; see also ANNE. MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 93-94 (1991) (pointing
out that de jure discrimination on basis of gender and religion is norm in modem Muslim societies although
they have repudiated pre-moden Shari'ah law on slavery).
187. MAYER, supra note 186, at 94. Christianity also underwent such a change during the
Enlightenment. At one point, notions like equality were evaluated according to Christian scripture. As time
passed, however, interpretations of scripture came to be evaluated according to the conclusions of reason.
This change had far-reaching implications for the development of Western liberal democracy. See generally
TURNER, supra note 163.
188. DOI, supra note 162, at 426.
189. SHAYBANI'S SIYAR, supra note 182, at 195.
190. MAYER, supra note 186, at 186-87.
191. QUR'AN 2:256.
192. Minister of Home Affairs v. Jamaluddin bin Othman, I MALAYAN W. 368-70, 418-20 (1989),
discussed in Mohammed Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Religion in Islamic Law, 21 CAPrrAL UNIv. L. REV.
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are disturbed that such charges would even be brought in the first place. 93
Concededly, traditional Islam allows for and even requires many practices
that advocates of democracy abhor, like the death sentence for apostasy.
Evidence also demonstrates, however, that modem Islamic scholars are
attempting to draw upon the rich traditions of Islam in order to encourage the
development of traditions that respect the dignity and rights of the individual
while remaining true to the teachings of Muhammed. A fair evaluation of the
probable record of an FIS government must therefore weigh the potential that
the FIS might implement a version of Islamic political theory that represses
human rights and democracy against the real potential for the development of
an Islamic political theory that supports human rights and pluralism.
IV. PROBABLE ACTIONS OF AN FIS PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY
This Part will examine the past, and potential future, record of the FIS in
order to evaluate this particular fundamentalist group's compatibility with the
ideals of pluralism and the structures of democracy. The picture that emerges
is not of a party wholeheartedly championing the modem Western vision of
a democratic society. Nevertheless, Section A will demonstrate that many
purported shortcomings of the FIS are not relevant, and Section B will show
that significant restraints existed to prevent the FIS from engaging in anti-
democratic action.
Millions of disenchanted and disenfranchised citizens in the Muslim world
have turned against their oppressive secular regimes, become suspicious of
Western ideas of democracy, and chosen instead to believe the promises of a
resurgent Islam. Throughout the Arab region, these movements identified as
Islamic fundamentalism possess natural advantages in the competition to
provide answers and hope after the failure of the authoritarian Westernized
post-independence regimes. 94  Islamic fundamentalism is readily
comprehensible by educated and uneducated alike and can draw upon a vast
array of profoundly familiar themes, symbols, and slogans. Because
authoritarian regimes, including the FLN, have attempted to thwart the creation
of alternative power structures like political parties, Islam has often been the
only widespread social institution exempt from the prohibitions and controls
placed on other institutions of civil society. Mosques, then, have been the only
organization capable of mobilizing the population and providing a meaningful
political alternative. 5 In addition, widespread poverty and unemployment
63, 68 (1992) (arguing that Islam has long tradition of religious freedom).
193. Westerners have grown accustomed to a religion (Christianity) that has its own penal code, and
that, since the demise of the Roman Catholic Church's temporal power, no longer seeks to punish people
with any sentence more severe than excommunication.
194. For much of the Islamic world, modernity is identified with colonialism, a system that dominated
and suppressed Islamic civilization for more than 200 years. A rejection of colonialism has extended,
therefore, to a rejection of modernity. BRUCE LAWRENCE, DEFENDERS OF GOD: THE FUNDAMENTALIST
REVOLT AGAINST THE MODERN AGE 100-01 (1989); Dilman, supra note 7, at 31,43 (describing capitalism
itself as linked in popular mind to colonialism and its evils).
195. See RUEDY, supra note 14, at 241. Colonial rule effectively eliminated Algerian civil society,
which has still not fully recovered. Diliman, supra note 7, at 50. Most Algerians have little interest in
nonfamily groups; thus, religion is one of the few forces capable of generating sufficient mass appeal to
sustain a national party. Although more than 30 other smaller parties developed, they were generally
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in the Arab world have created a populace ripe for radical change.1 96
Poverty, injustice, and corruption are so well known that sloganeers need not
even name them and can evoke support with the simple slogan, "Islam is the
solution., 197 From a practical standpoint, fundamentalist movements also
benefit from foreign Arab patrons whose oil wealth provides financial,
technical, and educational assistance. 198
More importantly, fundamentalists have actively addressed social problems
that the corrupt and inept governments they challenge chose to ignore. 9
Fundamentalists in Algeria have created a network of social services that
includes neighborhood charitable associations in neighborhoods with chronic
problems.2 These associations build or repair local mosques, which then
serve as community centers,"el provide literacy programs, plant gardens,
establish garbage services, teach the Qur'an, tutor students, and provide
activities for unemployed young people.2 2 Because they had earned the
respect and trust of the neighborhood population, these associations were quite
influential in promoting the FIS.20
This active social outlook on the part of the FIS stood in sharp contrast
to the loss of vision within the FLN. Even Yousfi Abdelbaqu, who led the
FLN from 1954 to 1962, admitted that his party was ideologically bankrupt
and that "[tlhe Islamic movement is the true heir of the [FLN]." 4 The FIS's
community work clearly generated broad support for the movement among the
population.
Many people in the West fear Islamic movements. Yet, just as nineteenth-
century American political philosophy - which we now view as sexist, racist,
and lacking in concern for environmental issues or human rights - led to
more positive developments, so some observers hope for similar developments
dominated by a single personality, had limited geographic appeal, and lacked a national party infrastructure
or viewpoint. RUEDY, supra note 14, at 252.
196. Dillman, supra note 7, at 46-48 (noting that social malaise creates conditions in which people
seek vision and charisma, thereby making demagogic and extremist movements attractive). In addition,
some view FIS candidates as simply more legitimate. Algerian youth favor political leaders who are young,
have professional experience, and speak classical Arabic (of which Madani is an eloquent master), whereas
the FLN has only utilized those with revolutionary credentials and has not developed new, young leadership
capable of appealing to the new, nonrevolutionary generation. Id. at 36-37.
197. Quandt, supra note 8, at 49.
198. Saudi Arabia and Iran provide millions of dollars to various fundamentalist movements. This
financial support obviously attracts ambitious followers, allows the movement to meet many human needs
in poverty-stricken areas, and finances a host of activities directed at achieving power and weakening the
authoritarian government
199. For a discussion of such efforts in Egypt, see John 0. Voll, Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab
World: Egypt and the Sudan, in FUNDAMENTALISM, supra note 4, at 345, 350 n.ll, 388.
200. Bekkar, supra note 35, at 13. The FIS has also supported the trabendos, or black markets, which
are often the only source of most staples of daily life. Ibrahim, Militant Muslims, supra note 26, at AI.
201. Id. A shortage of mosques and imans made this work possible. Reuters, Algeria: Mosque Goes
Underground Following Government's Banning of Islamic Salvation Front, MIDDLE E. MAG., Apr. 1, 1992.
Although these free mosques may technically have violated the 1971 law requiring official permission to
establish any association, Benjedid's government chose not to crack down on them and instead
accommodated the fundamentalist movement, hoping to co-opt it. Mortimer, supra note 18, at 578.
202. Bekkar, supra note 35, at 13-15.
203. Id.
204. Ibrahim, Militant Muslims, supra note 26, at A8.
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within the Islamic movements as they mature."
Several circumstances suggest that these movements will continue to
develop and mature rapidly in the near future. For example, Bernard Lewis
believes that the Arab experience during the last forty years of freedom from
colonial rule has taught the leading Islamic intellectuals and political figures
that freedom has a deeper meaning than mere political independence, that it
encompasses democracy and economic freedom, and that the lack of this kind
of freedom is the root of the problems in the Islamic world. Additionally, with
the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, Algeria and other
Arab states are free for the first time in centuries to direct their own future.
Viewing Islamic movements as developing entities raises the question of
what criteria are appropriate to critique their current conformity with
democratic and pluralistic ideals. Rather than expecting Islamic movements to
conform to the highly developed understanding of democracy present in mature
Western democracies, Western observers should arguably expect developing
democracies to adhere only to the fundamental essentials - popular vote and
rotation of power - and look to the future for the introduction of further
refinements.
A. The FIS Agenda
Because the FIS's vision of society has been advanced as a justification
for the coup, an analysis of the legitimacy of the coup must examine the
agenda of the FIS and its commitment to democracy.' This examination
must consider not only the position of the current leaders, but also the
probability of leadership changes in the near future.
1. Trends Within the FIS
The potential threat posed by the emergence of an FIS-dominated Islamic
state depends upon how the FIS views the state and its relationship to the
population. Unfortunately, analysis of FIS views is difficult because FIS
205. Bernard Lewis, Rethinking the Middle East, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1992, at 99, 119. Nevertheless,
Lewis notes with some concern that democracy has succeeded in only one Islamic state, Turkey, which
differs from the Arab world in three respects. First, Turkey is not an Arab state. Second, Turkey is
relatively economically developed. Lewis concludes from this fact that democracy may only be successful
in a state with a minimum level of social and economic development. Thus, until Arab states attain that
level, the West must not expect democracy to work in those states. Third, Lewis sees in Turkey the lesson
that some degree of separation of religious organizations from political organizations is necessary as well.
Id.
206. Some analysts view this question as irrelevant. Even though Professor Entelis believes that the
FIS's "ideology is linked to a religious agenda that is ultimately incompatible with democracy," he argues
that the West's sigh of relief when the FLN forcibly nullified the electoral victory of the PIS was
unacceptable. Rather, the outcome was a tragedy for the Algerian people and for Arab society from which
the West will suffer. The United States strongly condemned the suppression of Haiti's electoral result. Had
the U.S. government taken a similar stance in Algeria, it would have sent a strong message of belief in the
democratic prospects of the Arab world. By acquiescing to the suppression of the FIS, on the other hand,
the United States and other Western countries further their radicalization, a self-fulfilling prophecy that
would surely be best to avoid. John P. Entelis, Remarks in Session Il, Islam and Democracy: A Dilemma
for U.S. Policy, in THE SOREF SYMPOSIUM, ISLAM AND THE U.S.: CHALLENGES FOR THE NIETIES 42,43
(The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Apr. 27, 1992) [hereinafter SOREF].
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spokesmen used one vocabulary to incite the faithful and another to calm
outside observers. For example, after the FIS's parliamentary victory, its
leaders began to change their message to de-emphasize democracy and re-
emphasize the slogan, "No law. No constitution. Only the laws of God and the
Qur'an."' ' 7 Tunisian leader Rached Ghannouchi, whose views are very close
to those of the FIS, said in an interview with Western journalists that "[tihe
state is not something from God but from the people." He later told his
followers that they "must call into question the credibility of Western
democracy.... Ideas imported from the West concerning public liberties, the
rights of man, international law.., are nothing but myths and nonsense
destined to put us to sleep."08 Whether the speech or the interview
represents his real views is difficult to ascertain.
Divisions within its leadership also complicate a determination of the
current position and future path of the FIS. As often occurs in new movements
that represent a coalition of interests sharing a common enemy, the FIS
leadership delivered both "hard-sell" and "soft-sell" messages. 9 The two
leading figures in the party at that time, Abassi Madani and All Belhadj, sent
conflicting messages about Islam's compatibility with democracy. Abassi
Madani, an older, Western-educated philosophy professor, stressed the belief
that Islam taught toleration and could co-exist with democratic traditions.1
Ali Belhadj, on the other hand, is a fiery, more radical, younger iman known
for his repeated invocation of the theme of democracy's incompatibility with
Islam.21 The contradictory messages created doubt about which faction
would prevail if the FIS were elected, and the doubt prompted most secularists
to fear the worst.1 2 Yet, Abdelkader Hachani, who was elected acting FIS
leader upon the arrests of Madani and Belhadj, was a moderate who pledged
to respect the constitution and to avoid clashes with the army.213 His
moderate beliefs indicate that the FIS might have developed in a democratic
direction. Unfortunately, as the violence escalated over the next few years,
moderate elements within the FIS generally lost whatever influence they once
had.
Probably the best way to predict future developments within the FIS
leadership and decipher the mixed messages emanating from the FIS's pre-
election leadership is to examine the behavior of the FIS candidates elected as
207. Judith Miller, The Islamic Wave, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1992, at F38.
208. Dunn, supra note 4, at 17.
209. Mortimer, supra note 18, at 579.
210. Dilman, supra note 7, at 39; Mortimer, supra note 18, at 579; see also Cheriet, supra note 160,
at 171, 178.
211. Entelis & Atone, supra note 28, at 28; Mortimer, supra note 18, at 579.
212. FIS spokesmen not infrequently made statements expressing the sentiment that "[t]he Algerian
people have given victory to Islam and have defeated democracy, which is nothing but apostasy" Dunn,
supra note 4, at 16 (quoting sermon delivered on January 3, 1992 by Sheikh Abdelkader Moghni of FIS).
In contrast, Hamas, another party that seeks the establishment of an Islamic state, renounced force and gave
assurances that it would assume leadership only through democratic procedures. Youssef M. Ibrahim,
Algerian Militants in Big Election Rally, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 26, 1991, at A3. The FIS's decision to give no
such assurances despite the statements by Hamas thus increased concerns about its commitment to
democracy.
213. Algeria: Islamic Salvation Front Wins First Round of the Elections, AGENCE EUR., Jan. 3, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Aliwld File.
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municipal officials two years before the national elections. Such an
examination should consider, however, that the FLN-controlled national
government and the need of FIS candidates to cultivate popular support for the
upcoming national elections restrained these municipal officials' behavior.
These restraints would of course be absent in an FIS government.
In various places, the newly elected FIS municipal officials enforced
Islamic dress codes for women, prohibited the wearing of shorts, ended
coeducational classrooms in elementary schools, allowed only Arabic
correspondence, and prohibited alcohol. Moreover, in cities under their control,
the FIS failed to control informal patrols (gangs) that committed acts such as
tearing down satellite dishes that receive Italian strip-tease shows.1 4 These
actions are distasteful to a person conditioned to expect the broad individual
freedoms allowed in modem Western democracies. However, as Subsection
Three argues below, with the exception of the apparent toleration of informal
patrols, none of these issues is fundamentally incompatible with essential
principles of pluralism. With regard to the informal patrols, moreover, violence
is unfortunately still used, and used effectively, as a policy tool in Algeria.
Outsiders hence should favor force that works to uphold an imperfect
democratic process over force linked to an authoritarian coup.
Of course, if the FIS had assumed their elected role, they would have
confronted many more policy issues on a national level. Although the FIS's
exact actions had the coup not taken place cannot be predicted, they had
already presented some proposals for governance. The party repeatedly
promised to respect individual freedoms. Madani, for example, declared that
the FIS would "guarantee the freedom of all who have ideas on Algeria's
future."2 5 Critics note that the Ayatollah Khomeini made similar promises
before he assumed power in Iran in 1979.216 Still, rejecting Madani's promise
presumes that he lacked either the will, the power, or both, to abide by his
word. Madani's promise is no less trustworthy than the promise of future
democracy proffered by a junta in the midst of a military coup d'6tat supported
only by the widespread use of force. If the two promises are equally
untrustworthy, they offer no justification to either side, and the evaluation of
the FIS and of the coup must turn on other issues.
Consideration of the FIS's place in the larger schema of resurgent Islam
is also useful in determining the probable future direction of the party. One
prominent scholar, Robin Wright, distinguishes between two modem waves of
Islamic resurgence.1 7 Calling itself "Islamic Jihad" and "Holy War," the first
wave announced its war against the "other" as it sparked both the Iranian
Revolution in 1979 and the conflict in Lebanon in 1982.8 Wright suggests
that the second wave of modem Islamic resurgence in the late 1980s is a much
214. Foreigners Flee as Killersfrom God Pursue the 'Corrupters of the Earth,' SUNDAY TIMES, Mar.
27, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
215. Jill Smolowe, Islam: Ballots for Allah, TIME, June 25, 1990, at 26.
216. Id.
217. Wright, supra note 4, at 131-32.
218. Even radical Sh1'ite Iran is now forced to focus on internal economic problems and to seek
reentry into the international economic order, thus leaving it with much less time and ability to export its
radical revolution. Id. at 143-44.
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less serious threat by contrast. This second wave appears to be compatible with
democratic concepts and committed to a system of free elections rather than
to a forceful and immediate establishment of a theocracy ruled by clerics.
219
This difference is discernible in the second wave's choice of names, such as
the "Islamic Renaissance Party," which implies a focus on rebirth from inner
change rather than from purifying and purging all foreign, unclean elements.
The leaders of these second-wave movements of Islamic resurgence are
conversant with Western culture; many have earned graduate degrees from
Western universities. Madani, for example, studied English literature for three
years in London.an Yet, although they admire Western technology, they
abhor the West's lack of compassion, seen in its senior citizen nursing homes,
and the West's moral decay, seen in its pornography, alcoholism, and drug
abuse.22  In response to this perceived threat of Western decay, Islamists
seek to re-Islamize the culture, believing that their policies are ordained by
God for the proper functioning of society.222
The FIS, however, does not seem to fit clearly into either the first or
second wave, but seems instead to reflect a blend of the "holy war" and
"renaissance" approaches. For example, its name, the "Salvation Front," is less
than a declaration of holy war, but not quite an emphasis on renaissance. The
rhetoric of its leaders has often been radical and, like the first wave, concerned
with purifying Algeria from foreign culture. Before the coup, however, the FIS
demonstrated a commitment to working within the system and thus seemed to
be part of the second wave.
2. The Process of Democracy: The Allocation of Power
FIS opponents questioned whether the movement would have respected the
fundamental democratic principle of the rotation of power. Democracy is
meaningless if the winners refuse to give up power after an initial victory.
Without rotation of power, a society will never gain the full benefits of
democracy.
The argument against the FIS generally assumes that "a party which
presumes that it alone speaks for God will not willingly hand over power,
therefore it must be stopped."2 3 Determining the future intent of a single
person is difficult enough; determining the future intent of a party drawing its
support from millions of marginalized, unemployed, and disillusioned citizens
is infinitely more so. Different leaders within the FIS, and sometimes the same
leaders at different times, made widely varying statements concerning the FIS's
intent. The radical statements may have been merely campaign flourishes to
appeal to idealistic youth, or they may have reflected the real intent of the
219. Id. at 131-33. Wright notes that Islamists have learned the high economic cost of exclusion from
the community of nations through Iran, and that they have seen the dangers of totalitarianism and of direct
confrontation with the West through the collapse of communism. Id. at 132.
220. Lief, supra note 8, at 23.
221. Bob Hepburn, Islamic Zeal Gaining Force in Gaza Strip, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 5, 1991, at A2.
222. The Islamic-Confucian Connection: Civilizations at odds, NEw PERSPEcTIvES Q., June 22, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library.
223. Dunn, supra note 4, at 16.
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party leadership. 22 Similarly, statements that appear moderate and sensible
to Westerners might have been designed simply to appease the Algerian
secularists and the West, or they might have reflected the pragmatic and
principled views of a democratic, minority leadership. In the most likely
scenario, however, both sets of statements represented views of competing FIS
factions and evidenced the fact that the FIS itself had not fully resolved the
issue.225
a. Indications of Democratic Potential
Perhaps the most convincing indicator of democratic potential within the
leadership of the FIS was its behavior around the time of the coup.226
Tensions had escalated to dangerous levels many times in the previous three
years, but both the government and the FIS always backed away from the
brink of civil war.2 27 The FIS chose civil disobedience and nonviolence
rather than revolution. Moreover, when violence eventually did break out, it
came in response to the manifestly unfair, gerrymandered, and undemocratic
voting laws that made a mockery of the principle of "one man, one vote." The
FIS maintained a united refusal to react violently in the face of repeated
provocation by the junta leadership for a significant period after the coup.
Furthermore, unlike the potential threat that the FIS might refuse to rotate
power, this actual, demonstrated example of undemocratic behavior and the
junta's refusal to allow the rotation of power went uncondemned by Western
governments.
A second indicator of the FIS movement's democratic potential was its
emphasis on the needs of the Algerian people. Long before the FIS became a
political party, its members were active in organizing socio-economic projects.
They set up medical clinics, fed the hungry, taught literacy, and provided
mosques.' Although cynics accuse them of doing these things only to win
224. See Reisman, supra note 169, at 119. Reisman cautions that "one should not limit one's attention
to the readily available elite speeches to common people at Friday prayers .... The elites of Islamic
fundamentalism, like their counterparts in secular politics, carefully tailor their speeches so as to fit their
audience." Id.
225. Some commentators suggest that the mere existence of a radical minority will cause secular
parties to ignore even a significant majority that intends to work within the democratic process. See Entelis
& Arone, supra note 28, at 28-29; see also Dunn, supra note 4, at 20.
226. Entelis & Arone, supra note 28, at 29. "[O]nly time will tell" whether current Islamic
movements have truly embraced democracy. Id. (citing John L. Esposito & James P. Piscatori,
Democratization and Islam, 45 MIDDLE E. J. 438 (1991)).
227. Telephone interview with Kathleen Riley, Algerian Desk Officer, U.S. Dep't of State, (Dec. 10,
1992). Before the coup, moderates in both camps made statements that attempted to appeal to the other
side. The fundamentalists referred to the need for democracy, while democrats "acknowledged the
importance of Islamic cultural concerns." Diliman, supra note 7, at 50. This development in the thirty-year
"struggle for a definition of the sociocultural basis of society," id. at 49, represents considerable progress
in Algeria's potential evolution. However, progress could only occur with moderates in control of both the
government and the opposition.
228. Cheriet, supra note 35, at 9-10. Professor Cheriet, who teaches sociology at the University of
Algiers, draws a comparison between the FIS's recent use of the mosques and social organizations and the
similar network created decades earlier by the national movement when it sought independence. Id.
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votes,229 this social concern reflects one driving force of fundamentalism: it
not only seeks to purify the religion and morals of society, but also addresses
very real social and economic woes. The needs are connected; they believe that
economic and social failures are divine punishment for apostasy, and therefore,
that the best way to improve the standard of living is to restore the right
relationship with Allah.
Finally, some commentators have argued that the FIS's lack of detailed
economic and other plans indicated a lack of commitment to the democratic
process. This lack of preparation more likely indicated, however, a lack of
experience resulting from thirty years of authoritarian rule. Parties cannot
organize for national elections and create detailed economic and other plans at
the same time, especially when they do not have access to important economic
information held only by the government.
b. Indications of Undemocratic Potential
Perhaps the best indicator of undemocratic potential was the increase in
undemocratic rhetoric immediately after the FIS victory in the first round of
elections. Although this increase in rhetoric may have reflected no more than
struggles within the FIS over the direction of the party, the renewed vigor and
public visibility of anti-democratic factions of the FIS were worrisome. The
long-used slogan, "No constitution. No law. Only Allah and the Qur'an,"
boded ill for future elections.
The unceasing terrorist violence in Algeria since the coup, which
evidences the ascendancy of the FIS extremists, is a second indicator. The
current ascendancy of these extremists does not provide much guidance in
deciding whether to condone the coup, however, because they may never have
obtained such influence if the coup had not occurred.
The action of the FIS-run municipal councils provided a third possibly
negative indicator. The FIS passed many local laws that Westerners would
oppose." ° Nevertheless, the FIS controlled the municipal councils for almost
two years, more than enough time for the population to become disenchanted
with their leadership, and the people still supported the FIS overwhelmingly
in the parliamentary elections."3
In conclusion, while a significant faction within the FIS has demonstrated
its undemocratic views, it is very difficult to determine whether, without the
impetus of the coup, this faction would have succeeded in displacing the
moderate factions that controlled the FIS prior to the coup.
229. See Bekkar, supra note 35, at 13 (implicitly criticizing FIS's use of grassroots power of
charitable organizations and FIS's attempts to find activities for unemployed young people). A distinction
should be drawn between undemocratic intent and practices, and the use of religion for political ends.
Because advocates of radical social change are often motivated by deeply held religious beliefs, religious
rhetoric is not only very effective, but also accurately reflects the underlying motivation. Opponents of
religious speech, however, often mistakenly argue that this religious rhetoric is merely a ruse that does not
reflect actual motivations. See CARTER, supra note 151 (discussing failure of some critics to take seriously
religious rhetoric used in abolition and civil rights movements).
230. But see infra part V.A.3. for a discussion that concludes that many of the laws at issue do not
by themselves make the FIS incompatible with democracy.
231. Dunn, supra note 4, at 21.
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3. The Substance of Democracy: Limits on the Exercise of Power
Democracy requires more than just the possibility of the rotation of power.
It also requires recognition of certain substantive concerns, especially the
protection of minority rights. 2  In protecting minorities from oppression,
however, the difficult question is the definition of "oppression," distinguishing
it from mere inconvenience and even from repugnance. This Section will
consider several individual parts of the FIS's policy agenda and evaluate them
in light of the demands of democracy.
Secularists believed that the FIS would establish policies derived from its
fundamental religious beliefs and feared that these policies would be inimical
to the policies the secularists derive from their fundamental beliefs. Not every
Islamic policy is incompatible with democracy, however. For example,
American society insists that even pacifists who abhor war must support the
nation's war policy through paying taxes and, if they oppose only a certain war
and not all wars, by being subjected to the draft. Thus, at least in some issues,
democracy seems compatible with coercing individuals to accept the view that
the existence of policies with which they disagree, and even their financial
support of the government holding those policies, does not indicate their
support of those policies.
Secularists demand the same thing from religious believers, including the
FIS, when they tell them to be good citizens even though they abhor abortion
or even though they abhor the availability of pornography. The secularists
argue that the mere fact that the government permits and/or supports such
activities does not mean that the theist has supported or participated in such
activities, and the theist should therefore feel no responsibility for the policy
or for attempting to change it. Nonetheless, even the secularists are not
consistent in this regard, as they then argue that if the government permits, for
example, the display of a cr~che on public property, that it has supported the
religious beliefs of those who believe in what the creche represents in a way
that is antithetical to the beliefs of the secularist and is therefore irreconcilable
with neutrality between religions.
232. Democracy seeks to harness the fact that each individual will find herself in the majority at some
times and in the minority at others, depending on the issue. Over time, everyone will experience the
frustration of minority status, and thereby may develop sympathy for, and learn to respect the views of,
other minorities. This requires multiple factions, however.
Democratic governance depends on the give and take of compromise, on finding ways to obscure
differences, and on seeking coalitions. When only two alternatives exist, forming coalitions is not possible
or necessary. The conflict is obvious and cannot be hidden, thus making it more arduous to achieve
compromise because neither side can afford to be seen as "backing down." Algeria is not completely
polarized into two and only two groups. For example, the FFS, which won more seats than the FLN in the
aborted elections, is ideologically perhaps more compatible with the FLN than the FIS but nevertheless
supported the FIS in protesting the cancellation of the December 1991 elections. Even so, little common
ground existed between the FIS and the FLN, and the FLN did everything it could to increase the
polarization and attempt to capitalize on it.
As a result of this polarized choice between two ostensibly irreconcilable sets of values, the majority
and minority are seemingly more fixed. Islam leads to one set of choices for a broad range of contested
issues, while secularism also logically leads to a conflicting set of choices on those same issues. Instead
of finding the membership of the majority and minority constantly in flux (and perhaps in Algeria it would
be better to speak of two large minorities), membership in the two groups is fixed, and only a sub-critical
number of "swing voters" shift back and forth.
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Some individual FIS policies, like the U.S. one requiring pacifists to
finance war efforts, are not inimical to the creation or maintenance of
democracy. While these policies may be criticized as unwise or as falling short
of the optimum ideals of pluralism, they should be tolerated. Other proposed
FIS rules, however, are incompatible with democracy; these latter provisions
should be challenged.
a. Alcohol
One concern is whether the FIS's proposed ban on alcohol is compatible
with democracy. "Allah forbids" is not persuasive to the agnostic. On the other
hand, the idea of individual autonomy is not persuasive to the fundamentalist.
Just as secularists argue that fundamentalists do not need to drink alcohol if
they do not wish to do so but should nevertheless tolerate the right of others
to have access to it, so the fundamentalists can argue that the secularists do not
need to credit the argument "Allah forbids," but should tolerate the
fundamentalists' right to invoke this formulation in public policy debates.33
Both sides justify their policies by claiming that the other side will lead
individuals to make wrong decisions (to support wrong policy alternatives or
to consume alcohol), and by arguing that society must therefore protect truth
by restricting individual choice.
While unpopular, America's experiment with the prohibition of alcohol
is not generally viewed as having been anti-democratic. It thus supports the
conclusion that the FIS's policy proposal regarding alcohol is not relevant to
the analysis of whether an FIS regime could have been compatible with
democracy.
Hence, fear expressed with respect to this proposed FIS policy must arise
not from the content of the policy, but from its epistemological foundation.
Secularists fear that their own epistemological views will never receive a
proper hearing in public policy discussion under an FIS government. Of
course, the FIS has precisely the same objection to policy discussions
controlled by secular epistemological assumptions. Rather than adopting a per
se exclusion of one or the other view, democracy is intended to provide a
means of allowing popular will to address these very issues through the
democratic process of elections and representative government.
b. The Veil
Alcohol is a reasonably simple issue; the practice of veiling women is not.
In one sense, the practice of veiling is merely about defining the requirements
of modesty. Such standards have changed significantly and frequently
throughout history. In themselves, these standards do not affect the ability to
233. The contents of law and religion often coincide, Nafziger, supra note 144, at 151, so that
depriving someone of his right to refer to his religious beliefs also deprives him of his reference to the
"way in which [he] accept[s] and organize[s] the world around [him]." Id. (footnote omitted). To deny
religion a place in public discourse is to turn our backs on the fact that much of international (and
domestic) law is derived from religion. L. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th
ed. 1955) (describing international law as "in its origin essentially a product of Christian civilization").
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vote or influence political opinion. Consequently, as with alcohol, a wide range
of standards should be compatible with democratic society.
Yet, the question of the veil involves much more than merely a standard
of modesty. The veil34 has great symbolic significance in the current
struggle to define Islamic culture. Women wear the veil for a number of
different reasons. 23s Some women wear the veil because of personal religious
conviction. For them, it is a necessary part of their relationship with Allah and
therefore a necessary part of their own self-conception and self-respect. These
women almost certainly value traditional conceptions of womanhood.236 For
Islamic feminists, on the other hand, a return to the veil is symbolic of the loss
of hard-won gains toward sexual equality. Some women wear the chador
because they are poor and cannot afford Western clothes. Others wear it for
pragmatic reasons: to avoid pressure from their family or husband, sexual
harassment, or harassment by religious zealots, or to obtain social services
provided by Islamic groups. Also, for those who have only recently migrated
to the city, the veil provides a way of maintaining tradition and meaning in a
rapidly changing world, and of gaining membership in a supportive
community
2 7
In general, if the wearing of the veil is viewed as symbolic of the way that
Islamic society has traditionally subjugated women to men, the argument for
unveiling is compelling. If, however, the wearing of the veil is seen as an
Arab-Islamic response to the threat of Western culture, its use becomes much
less objectionable.23 8 Thus, considering the many reasons for wearing the
veil, its advocates may not be acting in a manner incompatible with
democracy."3
Furthermore, even if unveiling is a necessary prerequisite to gaining legal
and social equality for women, it still may not be an essential element of
democracy. The veil is highly symbolic, both for the equality of women and
for independence from the West. Because these two symbolic uses lead to
conflicting conclusions about the veil, removing the question of the veil from
the realm of public debate may not be possible or desirable - at least, not
without risking the alienation of groups whose participation in the political
234. Although this Section discusses the veil, the veil is not as objectionable as two related practices
that restrict a woman's ability to move about freely, thus restricting her freedom to participate in political
debate. These practices are the cloistering of women in the home (purdah) and the requirement that a
women travelling in public be accompanied by a male relative.
235. See Cheriet, supra note 160, at 205.
236. For example, "[a] recent survey indicated a majority of veiled female Egyptian university
students oppose women's work, believe men are superior to women, and accept the idea that a woman's
natural place is in the home." Bob Hepburn, Women's Role in Islam Shrouded in Controversy, TORONTO
STAR, Apr. 18, 1993, at F2.
237. Id.
238. Afsaneh Najmabadi, Hazards of Modernity and Morality: Women, State and Ideology in
Contemporary Iran, in WOMEN, ISLAM, AND THE STATE 48, 68 (Deniz Kandiyoti ed., 1991) (referring to
unveiling as Western conspiracy and source of all corruption, including immorality and triviality, so that
veil is necessary for protection from corruptions).
239. In addition, some women wear the veil in order to allow them to work for political liberation
from within the established Islamic system. Indeed, the willingness to wear the veil for tactical reasons,
while seeking to gain other types of equality and liberation first, is more popular among female feminists
than among male feminists, who tend to view unveiling as an important symbol that is necessary to
promote changes in social attitudes.
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process is a necessary pre-condition for minimum political stability. The
question then becomes whether the fight for women's equality can be fought
before the establishment of inviolable elections, rotation of power, and
representative government. If, as appears probable, Algerians cannot gain all
components of mature, modem democracy in one fell swoop, then they must
develop the more fundamental components first, and issues that are less
essential must wait their turn.
c. Women's Suffrage
Islamic fundamentalism denies women the right to vote. An FIS-controlled
government would be unlikely to change this policy and bring it more in line
with Western democratic principles. Yet, the junta went to the other extreme,
depriving everyone of the right to vote and dissolving hundreds of local
councils, and thereby depriving all citizens of democratic participation even in
local affairs.
An emerging democracy cannot be expected to utilize an enfranchisement
as broad as that currently used in Western democracies. While such an
enfranchisement would be preferable, a developing democracy might give the
vote to a more limited class just as early in the twentieth century the franchise
in many Western democracies extended only to property-owning, white,
Christian males. A comparison with economic development is perhaps
constructive: although full conformity with current international standards is
the goal, few financial analysts express disappointment with the emerging
markets so long as continuous reform is made in the right direction. Many
people seem, however, to expect that, while economic reform will take years
of incremental change, political reform should occur instantaneously.
The right of women to vote has become part of our image of democracy.
Women's suffrage, however, has only recently become an indispensable part
of the Western conception of democracy. Therefore, perhaps a society that
evinces encouraging trends toward democratization in all other areas but denies
women the right to vote should not be labeled undemocratic. The development
of democracies in the West in fact seems to indicate that once society is
committed to the principle of democracy for some, the yeast of equal
240. Entelis has provided a fine developmental definition of democratization expressing all of the
hopes that one could have for the future development of the FIS:
[Democratization is] a process through which the exercise of political power by regime and
state becomes less arbitrary, exclusive, and authoritarian; bargaining, as opposed to command,
takes on increasing importance in power relationships; alternative centers of power, or
influence, begin to appear, public political debate, and the expression of criticism and opposing
views, becomes increasingly evident; powerholders increasingly recognize the costs of
governance by coercion and threat as opposed to persuasion and reward; political leaders
increasingly realize that policy goals such as economic growth and even political stability may
be enhanced by allowing, or acquiescing in, greater autonomy for societal elements in politics;
powerholders may come to feel that increased participation enhances their and the system's
political legitimacy; and political legitimacy comes to be seen not as an abstract (and perhaps
dispensable) value but as an important political commodity or resource; and, for their part,
aspirants to power or incipient elites begin to perceive the realistic possibility of achieving
power, or sharing it, through conventional, legal procedures rather than by irregular and violent
means.
Entelis, supra note 1, at 12-13.
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protection works throughout society, however slowly, and makes it rise toward
universal freedom. Thus, although denial of women's suffrage does not
conform to Western notions of democracy, it is not necessarily undemocratic.
d. Other Select Issues
While the FIS received widespread support from Algerian businesses
disillusioned with the corruption and ineffectiveness of the FLN, it failed to
present a comprehensive plan for the economy." The few details it did
release evinced a desire to review relations with foreign creditors regarding
Algeria's burdensome debt as well as a desire to ban "usury." Foreign
investors feared these policies could have severely hampered economic
development in Algeria, 2 but they can be fairly compared only to those of
the pre-election and post-election secularized governments of Algeria, which
all failed miserably.
One part of the FIS's economic agenda that would have had serious social
and cultural implications was its plan to segregate the sexes to "protect the
family." In practice, this policy would have prevented women from working
outside the home. One proposal would have paid women to stay home in the
hope of combating unemployment by keeping females out of the job
market. 3 In addition, fundamentalists had already succeeded in forcing the
government to adopt a "Family Code" that contained many more concessions
to them than to feminist movements.2" Again, however, an FIS regime
would probably have faced the same incremental pressures to accept the
equality of women that Western governments have faced. The fact that the FIS
presently does not embrace such mature democratic ideals does not make it
fundamentally incompatible with democracy.
The desire of the FIS to protect Islamic culture also led it to advocate
Arabic as the only official language. This policy accompanied an attempt to
eliminate foreign, especially French, cultural influences from Algeria, and an
attempt to tie Algeria culturally and economically to eastern Arab nations such
as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf.' Realistically,
however, the FIS's move to adopt Arabic as the exclusive official language of
Algeria would be no different from a group advocating the exclusive use of
English as the official language of the United States. At any rate, intervention
to prevent such groups from voicing their views would be inappropriate in
either the United States or Algeria.
241. Algeria, INT'L REP., Jan. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
242. Land, supra note 57. For example, notwithstanding the fundamentalists'reassurances to Western
European nations that the flow of gas exports through the trans-Mediterranean pipeline would continue
uninterrupted, they nevertheless "vehemently opposed" a hydrocarbons law, passed just before the canceled
elections, that allows foreign corporations to own up to a 49% interest in exploration and development
operations and that attracted great interest from about twenty major Western corporations and the European
Community. Id. Although the secular governments in Algeria had not warmly embraced Israel or
democratic rights, they had at least demonstrated their desire and ability to provide oil to the West.
243. Peter R. Knauss, Algerian Women Since Independence, in STATE AND SOCIETY, supra note 1,
at 151, 161.
244. Id. at 163.
245. Ibrabim, Hope for Democracy, supra note 8, at Al.
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Many other aspects of the FIS's national vision have far-reaching
implications for the social and cultural structure of the nation. For example, the
FIS reportedly proposed the death penalty for those convicted of homosexuality
or adultery as well as a total ban on abortions. 6 Again, analogous situations
exist in the United States; nevertheless, few people would argue that these
situations justify anti-democratic intervention against the groups advocating
such proposals. Rather, opponents would use democratic rather than anti-
democratic measures to oppose legislative or executive efforts to enforce laws
against homosexuality and adultery, to extend the death penalty, or to eliminate
access to abortion.
Secularists feared and opposed precisely these proposals, and the
fundamentalists object to the secularists' efforts to impose opposite results. To
abandon democratic competition in favor of violent confrontation would be to
conclude, erroneously, that co-existence is impossible merely because of this
lack of consensus.
B. Existing Constraints on Anti-Democratic Actions by an FIS Parliament
Had the FIS succeeded in taking control of the Algerian parliament, the
ability of the fundamentalist majority to engage in anti-democratic behavior
would have depended upon the formal legal framework within which it
operated and the division of political power among the Algerian elites. The FIS
would have had to operate under a system of separation of powers. Power
would have been shared between the army, acting as a guardian of liberty,
legitimizer of the use of power, and arbitrator of disputes; the presidency,
wielding significant power through the administrative apparatus; and the FIS,
controlling the parliament; as well as the other opposition parties, the rapidly
maturing free press, and the FLN. This arrangement would clearly have been
preferable to the current one, in which the junta has absolute power and acts
as its own guardian, appointing and deposing the executive at will, imposing
martial law, censoring the press, banning opposition, and imprisoning political
opponents. In short, the junta, which is not subject to the countervailing power
of any other social institution, does not seem to be moving towards
democracy.'4 7
Drastic measures like the military coup should have waited until all
existing constraints failed to prevent the FIS from engaging in anti-democratic
activities. Many factors suggest that had the FIS been allowed to gain control
of the parliament, sufficient countervailing powers existed to constrain it.
First, the FIS was not monolithic; it contained both moderates who favored
or were willing to tolerate democratic participation and radicals who argued
in favor of an authoritarian government that would preserve fidelity to Islamic
tenets. Even if the authoritarian elements had gained ascendancy, the elements
that tolerated democracy would have remained a powerful force and would
246. Marshall & Sullivan, supra note 54, at 37.
247. Mortimer, supra note 18, at 575 (noting Algeria previously benefitted from "sturdy triple alliance
of army, state, and a single party"). This three-fold power base now has been reduced to a single (and thus
unrestrained) locus of power.
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have served to restrain the authoritarians. In addition, the realities of
governing, the necessity of foreign approval, and the necessity of compromise
with opposition both inside and outside the party would have forced some
moderation, if not in ultimate goals, at least in short-term tactics. ,
Second, the army would have retained significant power under an FIS-
controlled government. If, after being allowed into the parliament, the FIS had
attempted to eliminate future elections or to implement policies or laws
incompatible with democracy, the army could have intervened to prevent anti-
democratic laws or constitutional amendments.' The counterbalancing
concern here, which must have indeed been great if it was the concern that
prompted the coup, was that the senior leadership of the army would have
been purged by radical junior officers who sympathized with the FIS. 9
Third, President Benjedid would have retained his powers as president for
at least two more years. These powers were substantial. At one time, President
Benjedid enjoyed strong support and leadership in the army, the FLN, and the
government - the three traditional power centers in Algeria. As president,
he had demonstrated his commitment to reform: for example, President
Benjedid was the one who initiated the economic reforms of 1988. After the
1988 riots occurred, he not only acted to eliminate torture, which officers had
used to quell the riots, but also punished those responsible.' ° He also
continued his reform programs and held municipal elections. Although he
could have chosen to exclude religious parties from the political process, as
Tunisia and Turkey, among others, have done, President Benjedid revised the
constitution and opened the process to all opposition parties.z" He continued
the plans for parliamentary elections after the riots of 1990 despite the FIS
support of Hussein and in spite of their nondemocratic rhetoric. Most
importantly, he wanted to continue with the second round of parliamentary
elections even after the FIS's overwhelming victory in round one. President
Benjedid's actions demonstrate that he believed that a FIS parliament would
not irreversibly disrupt his plans for democratization, and that he and others
would continue to wield sufficient power to contain the FIS.sE
Fourth, the FIS's primary political rival, the Front for Socialist Forces,
opposed the coup from the beginning.-" It too believed that the system could
248. In a similar way, Jordan's King Hussein stepped in and removed the Muslim Brotherhood
cabinet members he had appointed after they offended secular forces by their changes in the Ministry of
Education. He thus gave them power and let them fail rather than excluding them ex ante. Dunn, supra note
4, at 21. See generally Musa Keilani, Islam, Democracy and Politics in Jordan, in SOREF, supra note 206,
at 25 (noting Jordan's success in co-opting Islamists, in contrast to Egyptian policies of suppression and
imprisonment, which resulted in militants' view that violence was only alternative and led to Sadat's
assassination).
249. Many enlisted men and junior officers were sympathetic to the FIS. Eventually, the generals
would have lost control of the army to younger officers. The generals may have believed this would occur
sooner rather than later and that they therefore had to act before they lost control.
250. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 21, at 9.
251. RUEDY, supra note 14, at 250-51. Benjedid could have rejected the FIS's party application on
the basis of a 1989 law that bans political parties organized "on an exclusively confessional basis."
Mortimer, supra note 18, at 580.
252. Entelis & Arone, supra note 28, at 35. He had been meeting with the FIS leadership, and rumors
surfaced that he had agreed to give them the ministries of defense and the interior. However, he stood firm
in his refusal to hold presidential elections early.
253. Dunn, supra note 4, at 18.
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work and that free elections would have best served its own interests.
Therefore, either the Front for Socialist Forces believed the FIS would not
attempt to eliminate elections, or that the FIS would fail if it tried, or it
expected the FIS to evolve towards regular free elections more quickly than the
junta.
In sum, the factors that could have constrained the FIS had the military
allowed it to assume power in parliament were considerable. The poor
democratic record of the junta after their intervention, their obvious self-
interest in retaining power, and the corruption of the government all provide
additional reasons to doubt the veracity and sincerity of the military's
expressed reasons for intervening.
V. A COMPARISON OF THE FIS'TO THE JUNTA
The preceding Part explained why the stereotype of fundamentalist
political agendas, and in particular the FIS agenda, presents fewer reasons for
concern than some analysts suggest. Nevertheless, the picture of the FIS that
emerges is not that of a party wholeheartedly championing a tolerant,
pluralistic society. A significant risk undoubtedly existed that, once in power,
the FIS would have implemented policies that exceed Western ideas of the
duties, powers, and role of the state. The question of the FIS's compatibility
with democracy is distinct, however, from the question of the legitimacy of the
coup.24
The comparison between the FIS and an ideal democracy is not
particularly helpful. The question is not Whether the FIS deviated from the
ideals of pluralism and democracy - clearly, it did so. So did the junta.
Therefore, the better focus for inquiry is which authoritarian alternative would
provide the greatest room for democratization in the future.s
The primary motivations for Algerians to support the FIS were apparently
a desire for egalitarianism and equal economic opportunity, and a belief that
the corrupt and self-interested government had betrayed its sacred trust to work
for the general welfare.sS Democracy, as a good in itself, seemed
254. The question of the FIS's compatibility with democracy is also distinct from the question of
whether Islam itself is compatible with democracy. This Article assumes that Islam, as one of mankind's
great religions with a long history of concern for humanity's welfare and the individual, contains streams
of thought within it that could accommodate democracy. The policy of the U.S. government concurs with
this view. Djerejian, supra note 129.
255. Other nations around the world are pursuing or have pursued second-best solutions, either with
U.S. approval or with little serious U.S. objection. For example, President Salinas in Mexico introduced
a free economy much faster than free elections. President Fujimori of Peru dissolved the Congress, fired
half of the Supreme Court, and began to rule by decree in order to attain the economic growth he viewed
as imperative - and he did all this with popular support, despite the questionable legality and clearly anti-
democratic nature of his actions. President Carlos Menem of Argentina acted in a similar fashion.
Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea also placed economic growth ahead of democratic reforms, preferring
to build a strong economic base before trying to build stable democracies, and instituting democratic
reforms only when the middle class was strong enough to insist on them. See John D. Sullivan, Democracy
and Global Economic Growth, WASH. Q., Spring 1992, at 175, 183 (arguing that participatory institutions
may need to be built before nations can profitably hold elections; and that "well-trained and experienced
legislators, political operatives, and elected officials at all levels, especially local government, are
indispensable").
256. Cheriet, supra note 35, at 9.
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The fundamentalists claim that "[t]he people of Algeria want an Islamic
state" and that "[t]hey should be allowed to choose this freely. ' ' 58 Even if
some commentators are right in doubting "whether a country in which a
majority inclines towards a theocratic view of the state can be
democratic,"" the principle of popular sovereignty should allow a society
to choose a theocracy favored by the majority rather than a secular
authoritarianism favored only by a minority.
A secular authoritarian government is likely to be interested merely in
maintaining power and wealth. So long as individuals did not cause trouble,
this type of government would probably ignore them, allowing them some
freedom to structure their own life. A religious authoritarian government, on
the other hand, would almost certainly be more concerned with conformity
because every part of life has religious implications, and because the theocracy
would self-consciously attempt to shape society to conform with religious
dictates. ,0 Thus, religious authoritarianism is much more likely than secular
authoritarianism to tend towards totalitarianism, and this difference might
justify favoring the secular alternative over the religious alternative.
Another argument offered for supporting the junta is that the government
had shown signs of democratization. However, while the junta's installation of
reform-minded President Boudiaf seemed to support democratic change, the
questions surrounding his assassination and the junta's subsequent record all
but extinguished hope for future reforms. The forced resignation of Benjedid
and other reformers demonstrated precisely the trait feared in the FIS - the
ouster of moderates by radicals.261
Some also argued that the junta would be more sensitive to the demands
of human dignity, human rights, and "representation" of the public. The actual
results of the coup are nevertheless strikingly similar to the fears that the junta
claimed justified its intervention. By failing to avoid these feared outcomes,
the junta's actions are illegitimate even when judged by its own standards.
Although some justify the coup as an undemocratic step necessary to
prevent fundamentalists from eliminating democracy, statements by the military
leadership have been as disturbing as statements made by the most extreme
fundamentalists. For example, one military officer reportedly responded to the
death and violence by noting that "one million Algerians died in the long fight
257. For example, and perhaps surprisingly, the FIS enjoys considerable support from militant women,
especially in its neighborhood charitable associations. Many of them even voluntarily wear the hijab, which
clothes them with respectability and allows them freedom of movement The FLN's adoption of
undemocratic means to suppress the FIS has given the FIS "the ideological and moral claim to say, 'The
FLN just doesn't want to let go of its power, its privilege.'" Bekkar, supra note 35, at 15.
258. Lara Marlowe, Algeria: Searching for Salvation, TME, Aug. 26, 1991, at 32. At the least, "Islam
is increasingly a defining force in evolving political agendas." Wright, supra note 4, at 131.
259. Ghiies, supra note 101, at 20.
260. This concern for control and conformity makes totalitarianism a threat to the value of human
dignity, which seeks to increase the civil order of private choice and to decrease the public order of control.
Some commentators believe this problem exists with fundamentalisms in general. See, e.g., LASSwELL &
McDOUoAi, FREE SocIEry, supra note 158, at 745, 864 ("The spreading 'fundamentalisms' of many
different kinds represent of course trends against the norms of human dignity.").
261. Within a relatively short period of time, reform appeared to have stopped, and trade was again
subject to nationalistic controls. Ghiles, supra note 101, at 19.
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for independence from France," indicating his belief that no price was too
great to avoid fundamentalist rule.62 Similarly, while the fundamentalists'
commitment to democracy may be questionable, so is that of the leadership
installed by the coup. For example, Ali Haroun, a member of the State
Council, rationalized the coup by saying that the FIS did not receive
"majority" endorsement.6 3 According to this logic, President Clinton would
have no right to govern the United States, since he too received less than an
absolute majority of the vote. Indeed, very few leaders in any democratic
country receive an absolute majority because large numbers of people
commonly do not vote.
Although the High State Council initially gave itself a December 1993
deadline to hold new elections, it soon began speaking instead in terms of a
preliminary referendum on constitutional reform, of the need to avoid frequent
changes in leadership, and of the need to give policies three to five years to
take effect.6' The elimination of the principle of rotation of power is
precisely what people feared from the FIS.
Perhaps the FIS would have been less democratic than the junta, but many
factors seem to indicate otherwise. First, the administrative and bureaucratic
establishment is indispensable to operation of the nation. The FIS and the
establishment came from the same families, and thus "[tihe historical and
subjective conditions for a systematic physical repression of the elite" were
absent.' 5 Second, in Algeria, unlike Iran, the fundamentalists had not taken
power by revolution. Despite obvious widespread support, the FIS waited
patiently for more than two years for an opportunity to come to power through
democratic means. Some of its policies might have violated norms held sacred
in the West; nonetheless, its record could hardly have been worse than the
demonstrated record of the junta. Are democratic norms violated more by
depriving all women of their vote, or by completely excluding fundamentalists
from the political process and subjecting tens of thousands of citizens to
arbitrary detention and torture? One injury is relatively mild but broad-based,
whereas the other injury affects far fewer individuals but seems much more
fundamental and severe. Moreover, the military coup d'6tat has also deprived
everyone, men and women, of their vote.
The military's action demonstrated from the very beginning an intention
to exclude the FIS and its supporters from political participation. The
experiences of South Africa, Gaza, and Northern Ireland illustrate that when
a large proportion of society has been excluded from political participation,
progress toward conflict resolution has occurred only when that fundamental
policy of exclusion has been reversed, and political participation, with its
262. Ernie Meyer, Look at Lebanon - That's the Future of War, THE JERUSALEM PoST, Apr. 16,
1989, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File.
263. Algeria: Democracy Has Its Drawbacks, THE AGE (Melbourne), Jan. 15, 1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File (noting that of 13 million eligible voters, 5.4 million did not vote while
FIS received 3.26 million votes).
264. Algeria: Kafi Calls for More Time, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Jan. 29, 1993, at 16, 16. In addition,
Abdesselam did not calm potential investors with his defense of the nationalist economic policies he
introduced in the 1970s. Algeria: No Growth in the Shadow of the Gun, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Dec. 25,
1992, at 6, 6.
265. Addi, supra note 147, at 37.
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implications for policy changes, has occurred.
Considering the FIS's uncertain future motives, the near certainty of future
constraints upon their exercise of power, and the indefinite conclusion
regarding which authoritarian alternative is better for the nation both in terms
of current protection of human rights and in terms of future democratization,
the junta's decision to interrupt the elections was not justified.
VI. CONCLUSION
The West's support for the repression instituted by the army rests on the
assumption that the junta will, someday, succeed in establishing democracy.
Unfortunately, the repression has so far only served to further radicalize the
opposition, thereby almost guaranteeing that the backlash, eventual failure of
the coup, and transition to legitimate power will be much more violent and
difficult.
This Article has examined the question of the legitimacy of the coup d'6tat
when evaluated against the ideals of a developing democracy. Some FIS
policies would be repulsive to a Westerner who is accustomed to greater levels
of personal autonomy, but these policies are nonetheless compatible with the
essential components of democracy. While other FIS polices are probably
incompatible, doubt remains as to whether the FIS would have been able to
implement its agenda and whether it would have moderated its position. The
FIS's agenda clearly falls short of the ultimate ideals of democracy. However,
even if the FIS was successful in implementing its proposed policies, it is
unlikely to have been worse than the government now in place, especially
when measured by standards of respect for human dignity and prospects for
future democratization.
The West has not accepted the fact that an Islamic pluralist democracy
will differ considerably from the modem Western Judeo-Christian secular
democracy. Developments in the mainstream of resurgent Islam may tend
towards greater acceptance of the ideals of human rights and pluralism. Hence,
Western proponents of democracy need to distinguish between the necessary
fundamentals of democracy and the non-essential enhancements, which
emerging democracies should be allowed to develop internally or assimilate at
their own pace.
Algeria presented an excellent opportunity to nurture an Islamic
fundamentalism compatible with democracy and pluralism. That opportunity,
however, has apparently been lost. The past few years have allowed the
extremist elements within both the government and the FIS to eliminate their
moderate rivals. Unhappily, in their responses to these events, Western
democracies have demonstrated that, despite their professed commitment to the
spread of democracy and pluralism, they are more attached to the maintenance
of secularism and thus prefer a brutal authoritarian regime over a potentially
democratic Islamic government.


